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Shareholder litigation is the most frequently maligned legal
check on managerial misconduct within corporations.' Derivative
lawsuits and federal securities class actions are portrayed as slackers
1. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical
Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 407 (2002) ("[W]ealth effects of derivative
lawsuits are negligible."); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991) ("[S]hareholder litigation is a weak, if not
ineffective, instrument of corporate governance."); cf. Rafael LaPorta et al., What Works in
Securities Laws? 8-10, 22 (July 16, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that private
enforcement of securities laws benefits stock markets), available at http://post.economics.
harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/securities_fixed.pdf. For a historical critique of derivative
litigation, see FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE
SUITS (1944) (commenting that derivative suits in the 1930s and early 1940s were largely
frivolous).
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in debates over how best to control the managerial agency costs
created by the separation of ownership and control in the modern
corporation.2 In each instance, early hopes that these suits would
effectively monitor managerial misconduct have been replaced with
concerns about the size of the litigation agency costs of such
representative litigation. Such litigation agency costs can arise when
a self-selected plaintiffs attorney and her client are appointed to
pursue the claims of an entire class of shareholders and have interests
that may differ from those of the class. 3
Now, however, a new form of shareholder litigation has
emerged that is distinct from derivative or securities fraud claims:
class action lawsuits filed under state law challenging director conduct
in mergers and acquisitions. The empirical data reported in this
article show that these acquisition-oriented suits are now the
dominant form of corporate litigation and outnumber derivative suits
by a wide margin.
Are these acquisition-oriented class actions just another
deadbeat in the corporate governance debate? Should policymakers
take action to cut back on the development of this new form of
shareholder litigation? In this paper, we argue that, just as with
derivative suits and securities fraud class actions, good policy must
balance the positive managerial agency cost reducing effects of these
acquisition-oriented shareholder suits against their litigation agency
costs.
To frame our analysis of acquisition-oriented class actions, we
begin with a look back at the history of this debate over representative
litigation in corporate and securities law. For six decades, there have
been efforts to limit shareholder derivative suits. These suits, in which
one shareholder sues in the name of and on behalf of the corporation,
2. By this separation of function, managers are given control over other people's money
even though the managers' individual interests may diverge from the interests of the group as a
whole. In this Article, we will refer to the costs arising from this possible divergence as
managerial agency costs. They have been the subject of vast literature beginning with Jensen
and Meckling's famous article. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
3. Thus, representative shareholder litigation designed to constrain management agency
costs may suffer from agency costs of its own, which we will call litigation agency costs.
Shareholder lawsuits are not perfect mechanisms for controlling management agency costs
because they are representative litigation, in that one self-appointed shareholder (and that
litigant's attorneys) champions the claims of an entire class of investors. The plaintiff class's
attorneys have much more to gain financially from a quick settlement of these suits than the
named plaintiff, and these incentives can lead these lawyers to sell out the shareholders that
they claim to represent. For a insightful critique of the problems of representative litigation, see
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
3, 5-6, 8 (1991).
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are. usually brought to enforce various fiduciary duties that officers
and directors owe corporations and their shareholders. They thus can
be contrasted to "normal" corporate litigation in which directors
determine what actions to take for the corporation. Derivative suits
were once said to have promise as a means to limit managerial agency
costs.
4
As early as 1944, however, states began to focus on the
negative attributes of derivative suits, passing statutes requiring
plaintiffs in derivative actions to post bonds to insure that they could
pay defendants' attorneys' fees and expenses if the lawsuit was
dismissed as frivolous. 5 More recently, state legislatures and courts
have added additional hurdles for plaintiffs to overcome, including
requirements that plaintiffs make a demand on the board of directors
before filing suit and permitting the use of special independent
litigation committees of boards of directors to decide if derivative suits
should be terminated.6 At the time of each of these cutbacks on the
reach of derivative actions, policymakers stressed their desire to
reduce litigation agency costs. 7
With the decline of derivative litigation, the focus of the policy
debate over the role of representative shareholder litigation shifted to
securities fraud class actions. They, too, had great potential for
reducing management agency costs.8 Yet, as the years passed, the
courts and policymakers began to stress the abuses that can grow out
of this form of representative litigation. By the early 1990s, plaintiffs'
law firms filing securities fraud class actions were accused of a whole
host of dubious practices, including using professional plaintiffs in
their cases, filing carbon copy complaints, and racing to the
courthouse to be the first to file a case before the ink was dry on a
company's press release of unexpectedly weak earnings. 9 In the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") of 1995, Congress
4. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (noting that derivative
suits have long been "the chief regulator of corporate management").
5. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 2003) (first enacted in 1944). This statute
followed a critical report about derivative litigation by Franklin Wood, for a committee of the
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York. WOOD, supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder
Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 96, 98-109 (1980).
7. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 404-05
(2002) (advocating the "radical solution" of an end to all derivative suits).
8. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (creating implied private right of action
for shareholders for violations of Rule 14a-9, and holding that "[pirivate enforcement of the proxy
rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action").
9. Elliott Weiss & John Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring. How Institutional
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2060-64
(1995).
[Vol. 57:1
2004] THE NEW LOOK OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 137
focused on these "indicators" of litigation agency costs and legislated
severe restrictions on securities fraud class actions, 10 perhaps at the
expense of permitting managerial agency costs to rise precipitously.1
Our research into the role of the Delaware courts in modern
corporate governance illustrates that derivative lawsuits and
securities fraud class actions form only two pieces of the shareholder
litigation puzzle. When we analyzed data that we had collected on all
suits filed in 1999 and 2000 in the Delaware Chancery Court, the
nation's leading corporate trial court, we were surprised to find that
approximately 80 percent of the breach of fiduciary duty claims, the
vast bulk of state court representative litigation, are class actions
against public companies challenging director action in an
acquisition. 12
These acquisition-oriented class actions dominate all other
forms of state court shareholder litigation.' 3 Moreover, in 1999 and
2000, the number of these class actions filed in Delaware alone
equaled about half of the total number of federal securities fraud class
actions filed in all federal district courts during that same two-year
period.14
10. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78
(2000)). PSLRA is a multi-pronged effort by Congress to rein in litigation agency costs by, among
other things, restricting the number of times that plaintiffs could file securities fraud lawsuits,
encouraging institutional investors to become lead plaintiffs, and creating the potential for
judicial sanctions against law firms found to be filing frivolous lawsuits. Id.
A few years later, Congress went on to wipe out states' concurrent jurisdiction to hear
securities fraud class action suits. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78). Proponents
claimed that the state courts were being used to end run PSLRA's restrictions, although the
Uniform Standards Act did allow states to retain jurisdiction of acquisition-oriented class action
suits. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1). The Uniform Standards Act's provisions do not cover shareholder
derivative actions. § 77p(f)(2)(B).
11. William S. Lerach, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-27 Months
Later: Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's
Brave New World, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 597 (1998).
12. By contrast, derivative suits, the traditional shareholder litigation that is the staple of
corporate law casebooks, make up only about 14 percent of all fiduciary duty suits. The
remaining suits are direct suits, intended to redress an individual shareholder's grievances.
13. While there are no national numbers collected for state courts, Delaware has for many
years been recognized as the national leader in the race to incorporate new and existing
companies. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6-8 (1993). Coupled
with its experienced judiciary and well-developed corporate law, this makes it the most
attractive forum for shareholder litigation among any of the states.
14. We are comparing the number of consolidated cases in Delaware with the total number
of consolidated securities fraud cases filed in all federal district courts. For further discussion of
this point, see infra note 154 and accompanying text.
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When we examine this new and dominant form of shareholder
litigation more closely, we find several key differences from, and some
similarities to, derivative suits and federal securities fraud class
actions. First, as expected, we find that like the other types of
representative litigation, these suits universally raise claims of high
managerial agency costs, although concentrated in mergers and
acquisition transactions in the market for corporate control. The suits
typically make allegations of failure to maximize shareholder value in
a sale of control under Revlon 15 or challenges under Weinberger16 to
the fairness of potential conflict-of-interest transactions, such as
control shareholder acquisitions and management buyouts.
Second, our acquisition-oriented class action suits have many
of the same characteristics identified in securities fraud and
derivative cases as indicators of litigation agency costs. For example,
in most cases multiple lawsuits with virtually identical complaints are
quickly filed, usually within a few days of the announcement of the
proposed acquisition. Over 75 percent of the time, the cases are filed
by a small, well-defined group of plaintiffs law firms in the name of a
professional cadre of plaintiff shareholders.1 7 Institutional investors
have almost no monitoring role in this litigation.
Yet, this is not the same old story that spurred Congress to
pass the PSLRA in 1995. There is no pattern of modest settlements for
the shareholder group and most of that money going to the attorneys,
as was sometimes found in earlier representative suits. Instead, we
find that there were large monetary settlements paid to shareholders
in many of these cases, that these settlements involved a substantially
lower percentage level of attorneys' fees as compared to securities
fraud class actions, and that these cases were pending for a relatively
short period of time.
Furthermore, beneficial settlements are not equally spread
among all acquisition complaints but are concentrated in cases where
a majority shareholder is squeezing out minority public shareholders
on disadvantageous terms, which we will call "control shareholder"
suits. Even within this subset of self-dealing transactions, settlements
producing a monetary return to shareholders do not occur across the
entire class of control shareholder suits. Instead, such settlements are
more likely to occur in cases where the initial offer price was
substantially lower than what was offered to shareholders in the
15. See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
16. See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
17. See infra tbls.12-13.
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remaining (non-settling) control shareholder transactions.18 We find
only a few monetary settlements in cases challenging director conduct
in management buyouts (MBOs) and third-party mergers, the other
forms of "friendly deals."19
Viewed from a broader perspective, shareholder acquisition
litigation polices those management transactions with the highest
potential for self-dealing. In other words, in settlements of acquisition
litigation, more so than in derivative and securities fraud suits, the
merits appear to matter.20 All of these factors support a claim that the
managerial agency cost reductions associated with acquisition suits
are higher than with the other forms of shareholder litigation.
At the very least, these class actions should reduce the
transaction costs associated with an acquisition if they provide a
comprehensive resolution to shareholder complaints about those deals,
even if the associated settlement does nothing more than raise the
price of the deal to the level that would have been offered without the
threat of litigation.21 A more optimistic perspective would be that
these acquisition-driven suits serve an important effect a priori:
corporate planners know the relative strength of the different legal
doctrines associated with different forms of acquisitions, and try to
minimize the costs of shareholder litigation by invoking procedural
protections like the use of special committees and by offering
shareholders a sufficiently high price for their shares that they do not
file suit.22  If they ignore this information, and do not offer
shareholders a sufficient premium for their stock, shareholder
litigation forces them to do so in many instances.
In the hostile deals-that is, those involving a bid opposed by
management, or deals where a second bidder shows up and tops a
18. When we add the amount of the settlement to the premium paid in the control
shareholders' initial offer, we find that the combined premium exceeds the premium originally
offered by control shareholders in the remaining transactions in our sample. This pattern is only
partially repeated in the MBO and friendly third-party transactions. Just as with the controlling
shareholder cases, the settlement pattern favors more payments being made in conflict-of-
interest transactions where shareholders claims are stronger, and suggests that the increased
consideration paid reflects the plaintiffs stronger likelihood of success. However, the settlements
are not as concentrated in the low premium cases as in the controlling shareholder cases,
suggesting that some other factor is driving them.
19. We categorize deals as friendly when they are initiated, or acquiesced in, by the
management of the company involved in the transaction.
20. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (claiming that the merits do not matter in
securities fraud class action settlements).
21. Romano, supra note 1, at 62-63.
22. Neither perspective is inconsistent with the view that existing legal doctrine is too
willing to permit recovery to plaintiffs in these cases, thus imposing tax on all acquisition
transactions, even if the data shows positive recovery to shareholders.
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friendly bid-we find that the bidders themselves also file suits in an
effort to improve the chances of the company being sold to a hostile
bidder or to a bidder not originally preferred by target management. 23
In these situations, we observe that representative suits appear to be
filed after the bidder's suit so that the class action rides on the
coattails of the bidder's case.
Monetary settlements are never achieved in the representative
shareholder litigation in hostile deals. We believe there are two main
reasons for this: first, these deals offer much higher premiums on
average than the other change-of-control transactions in our sample,
thereby undercutting any claim of unfairness to target company
shareholders; and second, the bidders do not perceive that the
shareholder plaintiffs have improved their chances of winning the
takeover contest, and therefore if the bidder is victorious it does not
offer the plaintiffs anything to settle the representative action. We
further find that bidder lawsuits have some success in forcing target
company directors to consider their bid to buy the company.
Placing our findings in the historical context of the debate over
the value of representative shareholder litigation, we believe that
acquisition-oriented class actions substantially reduce management
agency costs, while the litigation agency costs they create do not
appear excessive. For these suits, we therefore disagree with earlier
studies that have claimed that all representative shareholder
litigation has little, if any, effect in reducing management agency costs
and should be evaluated solely in terms of its litigation agency costs. 24
Shareholder litigation should be seen as a complement to other
corporate governance reform measures, such as the Sarbanes/Oxley
Act, 25 the changes in New York Stock Exchange listing standards, 26
and recommendations of groups like the Conference Board,27 which
23. "Hostile" deals are those that management is resisting as of the time that the complaint
is filed.
There may be substantial other benefits for shareholders from bidder litigation. For
example, the Delaware Chancery Court has limited the scope of deal protection provisions in a
number of recent cases. See, e.g., Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000); ACE
Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax
Minerals Co., Nos. CIV.A. 17398, 17383, 17427, 1999 WL 1054255 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999). By
narrowing the scope of these provisions, the court has increased the likelihood that subsequent
bidders may choose to offer competing bids.
24. Bhagat & Romano, supra note 1, at 405-08; Romano, supra note 1, at 84-85;.
25. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
26. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003) (approving
NYSE and NASD rule changes), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm.
27. COMM'N ON PUB. TRUST & PRIVATE ENTER., THE CONFERENCE BD., FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, PART 2: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, PART 3: AUDITING AND ACCOUNTING 2-28
(2003), http://fei.org/download/TCBPublicTrust2-3.pdf.
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have also focused on management agency cost reductions. These
reforms and the debate in their wake emphasize improving corporate
governance through changes in federal law and private ordering,
without further limiting shareholder litigation's role as one of the
menu of constraints on managers. Our findings support policymakers'
decision to focus on broader corporate governance changes, and to
leave shareholder litigation to continue to perform as it has in the
past. State court litigation remains a valuable tool to check
managerial agency costs. And, as two Delaware judges recently
observed, "state corporate laws come with a full-service commitment
to enforcement .... "28
This article proceeds as follows. Part I begins with a discussion
of corporate governance and the managerial agency cost reduction
effects of derivative and securities fraud litigation. We then examine
the theoretical and empirical evidence about the litigation agency
costs created by derivative litigation and securities fraud class actions,
and how policymakers have struggled to contain them. Part I
concludes with an analysis of how acquisition litigation differs from
the two more established types of shareholder litigation. In Part II,
we present an overview of the core data from our study of shareholder
litigation in Delaware. Part III presents our findings about class
actions in acquisition settings, and we finish with our policy
conclusions in Part IV.
I. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION'S ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
CORPORATE CONTROL
A. Representative Litigation and Managerial Agency Costs
Ownership and control are separated in most large public
corporations in the United States, with dispersed shareholders
delegating to professional managers the power to run these
companies. This separation of ownership and control creates
managerial agency costs because the interests of these managers do
not always coincide with those of the investors in these firms. 29
28. William B. Chandler, III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 953, 984 (2003).
29. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 2, at 309. Agency costs can be divided into three pieces:
monitoring costs, bonding expenditures, and the residual losses that are too costly to prevent.
Id. at 308.
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Managerial agency costs can be minimized in many ways:
through strong product, labor, and corporate control markets; by a
variety of corporate governance mechanisms or norms; or through
legal rules. Markets are an important mechanism for controlling
managerial agency costs. 30  Competition in product markets can
punish a firm's stock price directly if its managers shirk their duties
or enrich themselves at their shareholders' expense. Product
competition may also have indirect effects, as, for example, when
external financing may be more difficult to obtain if lenders believe
that the firm faces a risk of failure because it is not effectively
competing in the product market.3 1 The market for corporate control
will reinforce these effects if the company's stock price falls, and
investors become more willing to use their collective power to sell the
firm's stock.32 All of these markets will act as checks on managerial
agency costs.
Corporate governance structures and norms are a second line
of defense against managerial agency costs. For example, strong
boards of directors, audits by independent accounting firms, and the
listing requirements of self-regulatory organizations, such as the New
York Stock Exchange, may all act to reduce managerial slack.
Furthermore, norms of good corporate conduct, such as those
promulgated by the Conference Board, the Business Roundtable, or
the National Association of Corporate Directors have an important
role to play in stopping managerial misconduct.
Law plays an important role, too, in reducing managerial
agency costs. State corporate law provides the legal skeleton for the
corporation and for the development of corporate governance systems.
The directors of the corporation are given the power to manage and
direct the business and affairs of the corporation.33 Shareholders are
given more limited powers, essentially the right to sell their shares, to
vote their shares, and to sue to enforce their legal rights under state
law. 34 While shareholder voting has proven to be a relatively weak
30. For the most comprehensive presentation of these arguments, see FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
Product markets, labor markets, and the market for corporate control are examples of some of
the more important markets. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning
Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1083-84
(1998); Robert B. Thompson, The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 377,
380-82 (1990).
31. EASTERBROOK& FISCHEL, supra note 30, at 18-19.
32. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 58-59 (1996).
33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2001).
34. Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell and Sue, 62 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216-18 (1999).
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check on managerial actions, 35 derivative litigation in state courts and
securities fraud class actions in federal courts have historically .played
key roles in checking potential, or remedying actual, managerial
abuses.
1. Derivative Litigation's Effects on Managerial Agency Costs
Derivative actions are suits brought by a representative
shareholder, in the name of the corporation, to enforce its rights
against parties that injured it. These suits usually allege a breach of
fiduciary duty, a concept that has developed under the "care" and
"loyalty" headings, although "exculpation" clauses permitted by most
state statutes have limited the development of suits to monitor care.3 6
Fiduciary duty litigation through derivative suits has important direct
and indirect effects on managerial agency costs. Suppose, for
instance, that corporate executives have persuaded a company's
compensation committee to award them millions of dollars in
unwarranted stock option payments. A derivative lawsuit challenging
these awards can have the beneficial effect of forcing the executives to
return this unwarranted compensation, while also ensuring that the
company's stock option plan is properly interpreted in the future.37
A strong judicial opinion in such a case, upbraiding the
directors for failing to comply with their fiduciary duties, can have the
indirect benefit of deterring potential future wrongdoers at other
companies.38 Derivative litigation also makes boards of directors,
officers, and employees more active watchdogs for corporate
wrongdoing by others, and it can increase investor confidence that
corporate insiders will perform their jobs ably and loyally.
35. The main exception has been when it is used in conjunction with the shareholders' right
to sell their shares in the market for corporate control to facilitate a change of control transaction
in a joint tender offer and proxy contest. See, e.g., RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON,
ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1-12 (3d ed. Supp. 2001).
36. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (authorizing provision in company's
certificate of incorporation to exculpate directors for duty of care allegations).
37. See, e.g., Sanders v. Wang, No. 16640, 1999 WL 1044880 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1999).
38. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1009, 1009-1105 (1997).
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2. Federal Securities Fraud Class Actions and Managerial Agency
Cost Reductions
Complementing state corporate law and derivative actions,
federal law has played an increasingly important role in recent years,
both by requiring public disclosures of a growing amount of
information, and through class action lawsuits involving allegations of
securities fraud. The federal courts handle almost all of this securities
law litigation, especially after Congress enacted the Uniform
Standards Act in 1998.39 This legislation, which addressed what
Congress perceived to be abuses of the class action securities fraud
lawsuit, had the effect of preempting state courts from hearing most
securities law claims, although the "Delaware carve-out" preserves
state courts' ability to hear class actions in acquisition cases and a
limited number of other contexts. 40
Federal securities law class actions are brought in the name of
those who purchased or sold securities at a price that was affected by
misleading disclosures about the company. The defendants generally
are the company itself and its senior officers. The plaintiff class often
is large enough that it encompasses most of the company's
shareholders, with any claim producing a small amount for each
individual shareholder.
These suits usually do not directly challenge actions by
directors qua directors, but rather are primarily brought as claims
that the corporation and/or individual officers made false and/or
misleading disclosures to the company's shareholders. 41 Although
couched in disclosure terms, these allegations frequently attack the
very same corporate actions that are challenged in state court
39. For a discussion of the Uniform Standards Act of 1998, see supra note 10.
40. See supra note 10. The Delaware carve-out permits shareholder class action suits in
state court in two kinds of cases: "(1) a purchase or sale transaction where one side is the issuer
or an affiliate, and the other side is exclusively holders of the issuer's equity securities, and (2)
recommendations or other communications 'with respect to the sale of securities of the issuer'
made to equity holders by or on behalf of the issuer or an affiliate concerning (a) voting, (b)
acting in response to a tender or exchange offer, or (c) exercising dissenters' or appraisal rights."
Thompson, supra note 34, at 231 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1)(B) (2000)).
41. These ideas are further developed in Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities
Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 897 (2003)
(noting that federal law is directed more to officers' conduct in contrast to state law's focus on
directors' conduct). With the adoption of the New York Stock Exchange Listing Standards
requiring a majority of independent directors, this separation between the federal and state
function will become more noticeable. See supra note 26.
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shareholder litigation. The claims thus directly go to corporate
governance and the performance of management in running the
company. Federal securities fraud class actions can thereby result,
both directly and indirectly, in reductions of managerial agency costs.
3. State Acquisition Litigation and Managerial Agency Cost
Reductions
Delaware has recognized the risk of greater managerial agency
costs in acquisitions, as opposed to "ordinary" director decisions, and
has imposed additional legal duties on corporate directors in this
setting. In hostile takeovers, management entrenchment and refusal
to sell the company when a sale is in the shareholders' best interests
are serious risks posed by the delegation of these decisions to the
board of directors. In friendly sales to a third party, there is the
constant fear that management may sell the firm too cheaply in order
to obtain lucrative severance packages or employment contracts with
the acquirer. Finally, if management itself, or a controlling
shareholder, is the acquirer, managerial agency costs may be high
because of the conflict of interest between the managers' duty to get
the best deal for shareholders and their own self-interest (or that of
the controlling shareholder) in implementing terms that minimize
what the insiders will have to pay to gain control of the remaining
interests in the corporation.
The judicial response to higher managerial agency costs differs
between friendly deals and hostile acquisitions. The aggrieved
shareholders' legal claims have different underlying strengths in these
two settings, which we will discuss separately below.
a. The Legal Standards for Friendly Deals
Friendly transactions are often consummated through mergers
of the two companies. Mergers can only be accomplished on a friendly
basis, as both companies' boards of directors must approve the
transaction. In our sample, friendly mergers are usually either with
an independent third party, a management buyout group, or a
controlling shareholder entity. In the first two instances, shareholders
are protected to some degree by the state law requirement that both
companies solicit shareholders' votes and obtain majority approval for
the merger to be consummated.42 In control shareholder transactions,
however, this legal rule provides no protection as the majority
shareholder already has the votes it needs to approve the deal.
42. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2001).
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In order to reflect these different settings, the Delaware courts
apply different standards of review to shareholder claims alleging
director misconduct in a merger depending on the presence or absence
of a conflict of interest. When the merger is negotiated on an arm's
length basis, without any conflict of interest, the courts will normally
apply the highly deferential business judgment standard of review to
the allegations of the complaint.43
In a merger with a controlling shareholder, the bidder already
has a control block of the target company's stock, and it effectively
picks the target's board of directors. This renders it highly unlikely
that the target will resist being acquired by the control shareholder by
deploying defensive tactics. Control shareholder transactions,
however, such as a squeeze out of minority shareholders in a merger,
raise a different set of issues. When a shareholder with more than 50
percent voting power forces through a merger in order to cash out the
minority shareholders, these minority shareholders are powerless to
stop the transaction. In other words, the minority shareholders'
voting rights do not protect them against potentially abusive
transactions. Nor does their power to sell their shares into the market
provide protection, as the market price will already reflect the terms
proposed by the majority shareholder in the merger, and no third-
party bidder will be willing to bid in the face of the controlling
shareholder's dominant position.
Claims in the context of control shareholder transactions are
reviewed by the Delaware courts applying the standards first
announced in the classic case of Weinberger v. UOP.44 This decision
and its subsequent interpretations 45 require such conflicted mergers to
meet a judicial review based on entire fairness, as opposed to the more
deferential review of the business judgment rule. This legal standard
has teeth, as numerous court decisions favoring minority shareholders
bringing representative litigation have proven. 46
43. The most notable exception to this statement is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
888-89 (Del. 1985). Recent Delaware opinions have explored whether a tender offer by a
controlling shareholder is reviewed by a different standard than a merger. See In re Pure Res.,
Inc. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 433-47 (Del. Ch. 2002). This postdates the cases reported in
our data set.
44. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
45. The most significant of these later decisions is Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems,
Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
46. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 97 (2001) ('The decision in
Weinberger continues to be the seminal pronouncement by this Court regarding the entire
fairness standard of judicial review."). The case results described in Table 18 of this Article
reflect the continuing use of such claims in Delaware.
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b. The Legal Standards for Hostile Deals
In the mid to late 1980s, hostile deal litigation was very hot,
with bidder lawsuits leading to judicial decisions striking down
takeover defenses and rich fee awards to class counsel that filed
piggyback shareholder litigation. The success of these early cases
created an entire new jurisprudence for takeover litigation.
Beginning in 1985, the Delaware courts developed an
intermediate standard of review, more intrusive than the deferential
business judgment rule, but short of the entire fairness of Weinberger.
This enhanced scrutiny occurs in two settings that take their name
from two leading cases from the 1980s-the golden age of takeover law
in Delaware. In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum,47 the Delaware Supreme
Court held that defensive tactics by an ostensibly independent board
could still be subject to subjective bias; it therefore required that the
company prove that a threat to the corporation existed and that the
defensive tactic was a proportional response to that threat. The
Unocal test, while appearing rigorous, has in fact been relatively
benign in application, with few defensive tactics failing to pass its
standards. 48
Defendants have had much more trouble under the standards
set forth in Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes.49 Revlon requires that in
some, but by no means all, corporate control transactions, directors
take steps to maximize shareholder value.50 The promise of the
Revlon decision itself was that in any sale of corporate control, the
target company's board of directors had a duty to maximize
shareholder value by taking the highest price for the company. Yet as
students of corporate law learn, subsequent cases severely limit when
corporate directors have Revlon duties. After the Time/Warner
litigation,51 directors can negotiate a friendly stock-for-stock deal with
a publicly held acquirer and not trigger Revlon duties. Paramount v.
QVC reinstates Revlon in a friendly stock-for-stock deal if the acquirer
has a controlling shareholder such that the shareholders of the target
firm will effectively have lost their opportunity for a control
premium. 52
47. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
48. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role:
Sacred Space and Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 284 (2001) (survey of Delaware
cases between 1985 and 2000 applying Unocal found no defensive tactic failed to pass
proportionality test).
49. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
50. See id. at 184.
51. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
52. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
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B. Representative Shareholder Lawsuits and Litigation Agency Costs
Plaintiffs' lawyers are the dominant players in representative
shareholder litigation, whether derivative actions, securities fraud
class actions, or state acquisition-oriented class actions. While in
theory clients can and should control all litigation decisions, closely
monitoring the actions of their attorneys, 53  the reality in
representative litigation is that no individual shareholder has a
sufficiently large stake in the outcome of the case to spend much time
monitoring the attorneys. 54 The cost-benefit analysis for any single
investor usually shows that the investor's potential gains from the
litigation are miniscule compared to the expected costs from actively
monitoring the pursuit of the case. Most investors respond to these
incentives by remaining passive and may even be unaware that
litigation is going on until after a settlement has been reached.5 5 The
end result is under-investment by shareholders in monitoring class
counsel's efforts. 56
Poor monitoring creates the potential for agency costs, as the
entrepreneurial attorney's interests can diverge from those of the
clients. 57 If class counsel have tremendous discretion to run the
litigation, they may do so in a manner that maximizes their benefit,
even at the expense of the interests of their putative clients. For
example, class counsel may choose to settle a strong case quickly for a
small award of damages if they can obtain a large attorney fee award
with little effort.
53. John Coffee, Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 409 (2000) [hereinafter, Coffee, Exit]; John
Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the
Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 878 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Balancing].
54. Coffee, Balancing, supra note 53, at 884; Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen,
Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 424
(1993).
55. Macey & Miller, supra note 3, at 20.
56. The effectiveness of monitoring depends on the observability of the agent's performance,
whether that be direct observation by the principal or by examining the outcome. The legal
system contains provisions designed to reduce monitoring costs such as admission to the bar,
retention of membership, codes of ethics, and other rules of conduct. The legal system attempts
to reduce bonding costs, those expenditures that are made by agents to assure their principals of
the agent's trustworthiness, by the monopoly of the practice of law and reputational concerns.
57. Macey & Miller, supra note 3, at 3. There are substantial conflicts of interest between
attorney and client in the context of entrepreneurial litigation, and these conflicts of interest are
described as agency costs. All principal-agent relationships give rise to agency costs, which
consist of the costs of monitoring the agent, the costs the agent incurs to guarantee fidelity or to
bond him or herself to the principal, and the residual costs of opportunistic behavior that it is not
cost-efficient to prevent. Coffee, Balancing, supra note 53, at 883.
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Derivative suits were the first battleground over the
appropriate balance between litigation agency costs and management
agency costs. The United States Supreme Court addressed this
tradeoff over fifty years ago in its opinion in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp.:58
This [derivative] remedy, born of stockholder helplessness, was long the chief regulator
of corporate management and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser
forms of betrayal of stockholders' interests. It is argued, and not without reason, that
without it there would be little practical check on such abuses.
Unfortunately, the remedy itself provided opportunity for abuse, which was not
neglected. Suits sometimes were brought not to redress real wrongs, but to realize upon
their nuisance value. They were bought off by secret settlements in which any wrongs
to the general body of share owners were compounded by the suing stockholder, who
was mollified by payments from corporate assets.
59
The Court, while noting the importance of the derivative action
as a check on managerial agency costs, was more concerned about the
potential for abusive "strike suits" that would generate high litigation
agency costs. Striking the balance between the two in that case in
favor of cutting litigation agency costs, the Court upheld New Jersey's
statutory requirement that plaintiffs in derivative actions post a bond
as security for payment of defendants' legal fees in the event that the
action was dismissed as without merit.60 Posting security for the
defendants' expenses in defending the suit was one of the early efforts
made by legislatures to reduce the litigation agency costs of derivative
litigation.
Derivative litigation's costs were detailed in a report by
Franklin Wood to the New York Chamber of Commerce in 1944.61
Wood and his team interviewed a large number of lawyers and
collected data on all derivative suits filed in two counties of the State
of New York and in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York between 1932 and 1942.62 They published a
scathing indictment of derivative suits, finding them to be filed by
shareholders "having no real financial interest in the corporation,"
with it "being obvious that the only one likely to profit substantially in
the event of success is the [plaintiffs] attorney. '63 They found that a
small group of plaintiffs' attorneys filed most of these cases, that they
58. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
59. Id. at 548.
60. Id. at 554-55.
61. WOOD, supra note 1.
62. Id. at 2. The two counties were New York County and Kings County. Id. at 3. For Kings
County, Wood's team only collected data for 1938-42. Id. at 3.
63. Id. at 112.
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earned very substantial fees when they were successful in court or by
striking a settlement, and that they were frequently jockeying for
position as "general" counsel; these factors led to the filing of many
duplicative and substantially identical complaints. 64  In our
terminology, Wood was claiming that derivative actions had high
litigation agency costs.
Finally, Wood argued that these cases had little impact on
managerial agency costs, despite the large settlements involved in
many of them, because "[i]n substantially all instances the opinions
approving the settlement have absolved the defendants from any
charge of bad faith."65 Wood also pointed to the fact that on average
these cases settled for less than 3 percent of the amounts demanded in
the complaints, that the courts approved the settlements as adequate
in almost every case, and that "derivative actions more than most
others lend themselves to settlement as an insurance measure . "..."66
Based on Wood's report, the New York legislature enacted a new
provision of that state's corporate code, requiring plaintiffs in
derivative actions who held less than 5 percent, or $50,000, of the
defendant company's stock to post bond for the company's expenses in
defending the action.67
Courts and legislatures have also subjected derivative suits to
additional limitations, including the contemporaneous ownership
requirement 68 and, most importantly, the demand requirement, in an
attempt to prevent litigation agency costs. 69 Unfortunately, these
64. Id. at 57, 75, 78, 82, 112. The term general counsel refers to what would now be called
lead counsel.
65. See id. at 42.
66. Id.
67. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 2003) (first enacted in 1944). The 5 percent
threshold appears to have been derived by examining the size of the stakes of shareholders filing
derivative actions against close corporations. WOOD, supra note 1, at 30-31. The average
shareholder plaintiff in these cases held more than 30 percent of the company's stock, and in less
than 7 percent of these cases did the plaintiff hold less than 5 percent of the company's stock. Id.
at 31. As of 2003, 16 states have these security for expenses statutes. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT,
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS § 3:2, at 3-5 (2003).
68. The contemporaneous ownership requirement mandates that the named plaintiff in a
derivative suit be a shareholder at the time of the transaction and at the time of filing of the suit.
JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS 424 (1997). Alternatively, the named plaintiffs may have
obtained their shares by operation of law from someone who was a shareholder at the time of the
filing of the suit. Id.
69. The demand requirement forces a potential plaintiff to first make demand on the
company's board of directors to remedy the alleged misconduct, or to allege why such demand
would be futile. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive
Pay:An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 576 (2001).
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requirements cannot perfectly differentiate between meritorious and
non-meritorious suits, and therefore they deter both types of suit.70
Federal securities fraud class actions are a second form of
representative shareholder litigation in which strong concerns have
been raised about litigation agency costs. Prior to 1995, courts and
legislatures had developed some protections against high litigation
agency costs in securities fraud class action litigation. For example,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regulated who could be the
named plaintiff in these cases. In an effort to minimize litigation
agency costs, two requirements were imposed on plaintiffs: the claim
of the named plaintiff had to be typical of the claims of absent
shareholders, and the named plaintiff had to be capable of providing
adequate representation of the class. 71
Typicality requires a close fit between the representative
plaintiffs interests and the interest of absent parties, while adequacy
of representation refers to the ability and willingness of the named
plaintiff to act as a competent champion of the corporation.
Unfortunately, these procedural safeguards were easily circumvented,
as they were only likely to be enforced by defendants, who often had
little interest in insuring that named plaintiffs satisfied either
criterion.72
Faced with allegations of serious abuses, Congress perceived a
need to impose further restrictions on litigation agency costs in
securities fraud cases and passed the PSLRA in 1995. 73 The Act
imposed unique requirements and limitations on private class actions
brought in federal courts and alleging securities fraud. These
requirements and limitations were intended to realign agent and
principal interests by altering the representation requirement,
70. Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 140
(1985); see also Tim Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and the
Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 372 (1993). In some states, however, courts have
discretion in how they apply these requirements. Thus, in California, for example, the court has
discretion to require any plaintiff to post security for the defendant's expenses, irrespective of
how much stock they hold. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West 1990).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Macey & Miller, supra note 3, at 61-62; Elliot J. Weiss, The Impact to
Date of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 561, 570 (1997).
72. The defendant is more likely to act strategically to serve his or her own interests by
using the typicality and adequacy rules as a means for influencing the choice of plaintiffs
counsel. Macey & Miller, supra note 3, at 64. The defendant may benefit if the plaintiff is not
typical and has interests in the litigation not shared by the corporation because the defendant
may find a way to settle the case cheaply in a way that favors the named plaintiff at the expense
of the corporation or other shareholders. Id.
73. John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Genesis of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335 (1996).
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discovery, and the settlement process.74  The adequacy of the
representation requirement was modified to give greater control of the
conduct of class actions to those investors, usually institutional
investors, holding the largest stakes in the defendant companies. 75
Other changes included efforts to limit the class action lawyer's ability
to generate litigation through the use of professional plaintiffs. These
efforts proceeded by limiting the number of lawsuits in which an
individual could serve as class representative, banning referral fees to
brokers, and prohibiting class representatives from receiving special
compensation. 76
While the lack of effective client monitoring is a problem with
all representative litigation, special aspects to the problem have been
identified in earlier public discussions and empirical research about
derivative actions and federal securities fraud class actions. We turn
first to identifying the common indicia of litigation agency costs and
then to describing the prior evidence about the extent to which these
indicia have been identified in derivative actions and securities class
action. We then turn in the next part to how acquisition class actions
differ.
1. Indicia of Litigation Agency Costs
Given existing research, and prior public discussions, what
generalizations can we draw about the manifestations of litigation
agency costs in representative litigation? We believe we can distill
eight different indicia that have been identified as problematic
through public discussions of derivative suits and securities fraud
litigation. While each of these factors can be interpreted in different,
and often conflicting, ways, in the earlier policy debates they were the
most commonly maligned features of these suits. Without discounting
74. Id. at 373-76.
75. Id. at 373-75. PSLRA requires the first plaintiff to file a complaint and, within 20 days,
to provide notice to members of the purported class in a widely circulated business publication.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i) (2000). The notice must identify the claims alleged and the
purported class period and must inform potential class members that they may move to serve as
the lead plaintiff. Within 90 days of the published notice, the court must consider the motions to
appoint the lead plaintiff, and the Act introduces the concept of the most adequate plaintiff to
help judges make the decision. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i).
The Act creates a rebuttable presumption that the person or entity appointed should be the
one most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members. Id. at 78u-
4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). The most adequate plaintiff would be one that has responded to the notice, has
the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class, and fits all other Rule 23
requirements.
76. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
533, 536-37 (1997).
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the possibility that some of these factors serve valuable functions, we
label them as indicators of litigation agency costs because that is how
they were treated during those earlier discussions.
First, are the representative suits settled out of court quickly
for small amounts but with substantial attorney fee awards? This is
the most frequently cited complaint about class action litigation: that
entrepreneurial attorneys bring non-meritorious suits for their
nuisance and settlement value.77 The defendants' and plaintiffs'
asymmetric stakes 78 and cost differentials 79 in these cases make it
economically rational for defendants to settle even frivolous cases,
while plaintiffs' attorneys can reduce their risks by having a portfolio
of cases that they settle for too little money.80
This leads to the second question about litigation agency costs:
is the recovery small compared to the alleged damages in the case?81 If
the plaintiffs' attorneys are settling cases quickly for small amounts,
one possible implication of their actions is that the case is a nuisance
claim brought only to collect an attorneys' fee award.8 2
Third, is a large portion of the recovery going to the attorney
for the class? This is an obvious area of concern because of the worry
that attorneys will take more than their fair share of the recovery for
77. Brandi, supra note 70, at 369; D. Brian Hufford, Deterring Fraud vs. Avoiding the Strike
Suit: Reaching an Appropriate Balance, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 593, 601 (1995).
78. Coffee, Balancing, supra note 53, at 889-91 (noting that defendants have much more at
stake in this litigation than the plaintiffs' attorneys); John Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action: A
Policy Primer for Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 635 (1987).
79. Coffee, Balancing, supra note 53, at 891 (stating that defendants' costs of litigating
these cases will be much higher because the burden of discovery falls heavily on their shoulders).
80. Every professor has a favorite example of what appears to be a bad settlement of a good
corporate claim. Ours is Sullivan v. Hammer, No. CIV.A.10823, 1990 WL 114223 (Del. Ch. Aug.
7, 1990).
81. While this is a very important problem, it is also one of the most difficult to measure
empirically because the size of potential damage awards is difficult to calculate in most
representative litigation. This is particularly difficult in derivative litigation where it may be
unclear what the appropriate damages are for a director's alleged breach of fiduciary duties.
Even in federal securities litigation, where we can calculate with a higher degree of certainty the
drop in the market value of a security during a fraud interval, there are still many
disagreements about the appropriate method for doing so, and what constitutes a reasonable
percentage recovery from the often enormous potential damages. E.g., Bradford Cornell & R.
Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37
UCLA L. REV. 883 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in
Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 611-12 (1985); see also Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffry M.
Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases: Applications at the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 49 BuS. LAW. 545 (1994). It is almost impossible to calculate the
potential damages in these cases without detailed factual information about each case. This
restricts us to a comparison of the size of the damage awards paid in the settlement, which is
much less useful in determining whether the settlement was abusive.
82. Of course, there are other possible explanations for such actions, such as a lack of
resources among the potential defendants.
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themselves at the expense of the class. Such concerns are particularly
strong when the class recovery is not in the form of cash, but rather in
the form of apparently minor changes in corporate governance
structures. If the recovery is structured so that class counsel receives
all of the cash in the settlement, while the class members get only the
uncertain potential for future corporate governance benefits, this
raises the specter of high litigation agency costs.
Fourth, are the cases settling out of court with little activity?
If cases are filed, sit idle for extended periods of time, and then settle
or are dismissed without evidence of any action by the plaintiffs'
attorneys, the claim could be made that these cases amount to little
more than a sale of a release of all potential claims in litigation.8 3 By
contrast, when the defendant and plaintiff actively litigate the merits
of the case, filing substantive motions and taking discovery, with the
court actively involved in deciding various aspects of the case, it
appears that both sides believe that the case is worth investing time
and resources in litigating. There is no better evidence that the
plaintiffs' law firm believes in its case than its willingness to invest its
time and money in it.
Fifth, are these suits filed quickly after a public announcement
of information about the company's activities? If so, this may indicate
that the attorneys' interest in becoming lead counsel exceeds their
interest in filing a meritorious lawsuit.8 4 For example, in the debate
about the merits of federal securities litigation prior to 1995, class
action suits were often claimed to have been filed within days of the
announcement of unexpected drops in corporate earnings. This was
publicly portrayed as an example of the plaintiffs' attorneys' "race to
the courthouse" in an attempt to be named the lead counsel in these
cases.8 5 Capturing the lead counsel position can be lucrative for these
83. Alternatively, the litigation could be playing a supporting role in a larger negotiation,
such as may occur when the minority shareholders' interests are also being represented by a
special committee of the board of directors in a control shareholder squeeze out transaction. In
this situation, we would not necessarily want the litigation to be actively pursued unless
negotiations between the acquirer and the special committee collapsed or went amiss.
84. Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead
Counsel Under PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 57 (2001) (noting also that rapid filing
may lead lawyers to "seek out prospective plaintiffs rather than waiting to be approached," and
that class counsel may be chosen "with little consideration given to qualifications").
85. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman suggest that plaintiffs' attorneys will "share
copies of their complaints with other plaintiffs' lawyers who will support their election as lead
counsel." Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs
in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2063 (1995). An alternative positive
interpretation of quick filing of suits in an acquisition context is that the attorneys are
attempting to obtain an injunction to stop the completion of the transaction until a court can
determine the fairness of the consideration. While this is plausible, it is not supported by the
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attorneys,8 6 but hasty filing of frivolous suits may inflict needless costs
on the shareholders, whom the attorney is supposed to be
representing.
Sixth, are multiple lawsuits being filed against the company for
the same alleged wrongdoing? Once a single representative action has
been filed, the shareholders' interests in correcting any wrongs are
presumably protected; filing more suits may simply raise the costs to
shareholders of challenging the board's actions.8 7  The plaintiffs'
attorneys that were not the first to file their case still have an interest
in participating in the litigation, however, as they might still be
named lead counsel, or become a member of a syndicate of plaintiffs'
attorneys that prosecutes the case. Thus, prior to 1995, it was
common in federal securities litigation to find multiple class action
complaints being filed against the same defendants alleging the same
misconduct, often using identical language.88
Seventh, does this type of litigation target a particular type of
company? If these representative suits are filed based on their merits,
then this type of litigation should name defendant companies from a
broad spectrum of industries on a geographically dispersed basis for a
wide variety of alleged wrongdoing. Should we find that these suits
target only a particular type of company for a particular alleged form
of wrongdoing, then it may be the case that the attorneys' incentives
are what is driving the litigation rather than the merits of the case.
Consider the high-technology industry, which was subjected to a
disproportionate number of federal securities fraud lawsuits prior to
data in our sample. We found 53 lead cases (of a total of 348) where motions for a preliminary
injunction or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) were filed. Less than half of these (24) were
in acquisition cases that would be relevant to this point. Of those 24, an order was granted in
two cases, one transaction that involved a controlling shareholder and one in a third-party
transaction. (There was also one non-acquisition in which a motion was granted.) For the
remainder of the 53 cases in which a preliminary injunction or TRO motion was made, there was
no indication on the docket sheet that the motion had been briefed or a hearing sought.
A third possibility is that the suits are filed quickly because in an acquisition, there is not
much for the plaintiffs' counsel to find out: the premium has been announced, the identity of the
parties (and possibility of a conflict of interest) is known, and the claim is that the price is too
low. There is no need to engage in the same level of discovery that is needed in a securities fraud
action, where it will be necessary to establish scienter.
86. Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of
Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 601 (1996)
("Currently, the lead counsel position is quite lucrative and the plaintiffs class action counsel
have a significant interest in obtaining that spot.").
87. It is also possible that there will be beneficial effects of filing more suits, such as an
increased likelihood of a favorable settlement or the appointment of better qualified lead counsel.
88. See infra notes 190, 193.
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1995.89 High stock price volatility and heavy share turnover are often
claimed to have contributed to this industry's litigation risk.90 In
congressional hearings prior to the passage of the PSLRA, defendants
claimed, and Congress appears to have accepted as true, that
plaintiffs' lawyers were filing these cases against high-tech firms
"whenever a stock price drops more than ten percent."91 Large stock
price drops and high share turnover both inflate potential damage
claims that can be made in Rule 10b-5 cases, making these firms more
attractive targets to attorneys. However, these events do not increase
the likelihood of fraud, which makes the higher number of fraud suits
against high-tech firms suspect.
Finally, are there a small number of repeat law firms that file
these actions, and a small number of professional plaintiffs that
appear in them? 92 There are obvious benefits from specialization by
law firms in the sometimes arcane aspects of shareholder
representative litigation and, at least in theory, benefits from having
knowledgeable class representatives. Critics have claimed that, in
practice, this inner "clique" acts to further its own interests at the
expense of the shareholder class. 93 For example, the small number of
repeat players in the industry may facilitate collusive divisions of the
fees that are garnered in settlements with one firm agreeing to give up
its claim to lead counsel position in the present action in order to gain
other firms' support for its application to be lead counsel in the next
action. 94 Obviously, competition to become lead counsel will suffer in
this circumstance, and the class's interests in getting the best
representation possible could be sacrificed as well.
89. Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's
Experience 13-14 (Feb. 27, 1997) (unpublished working paper, on file with authors).
90. Christopher L. Jones & Seth E. Weingram, Why lOb-5 Litigation Risk Is Higher for
Technology and Financial Services Firms (July 1996) (unpublished working paper, on file with
authors).
91. Avery, supra note 73, at 339.
92. Even the earliest studies of shareholder litigation found that they were filed on behalf of
a small group of named investors by a well-identified subset of law firms which specialized in
bringing this form of litigation. WOOD, supra note 1; see also LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL,
GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT: THE ANTISEMITIC ORIGINS OF RESTRICTIONS ON STOCKHOLDER
LITIGATION, (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 44, 2002) (criticizing
the Wood Report), http://ssrn.com/abstract=321680).
93. Macey & Miller, supra note 3, at 1, 3, 5-6, 8.
94. The plaintiffs' law firms will commonly form a loose syndicate to represent the class.
Lead counsel will get the lion's share of the work, but the other members of the group will each
contribute something to the representation. If there is a positive settlement, the fee will be
divided among the firms, with lead counsel getting the biggest portion and the other firms
receiving payments that reflect their contributions to the case.
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Similarly, professional plaintiffs almost always appear in cases
represented by the same firm over and over again, creating the
appearance that the plaintiffs are not independent from their counsel
and are acting on the firm's behalf, rather than the other way around.
If so, these plaintiffs' ability and willingness to actively monitor the
actions of their counsel is called into question.
We turn next to a summary of the prior empirical evidence that
has been compiled about these litigation agency cost indicia.
2. Litigation Agency Costs in Derivative Actions and Securities Fraud
Class Actions: Prior Empirical Work
Prior studies of litigation agency costs in derivative suits and
securities class actions provide us a foundation to analyze data as to
the state court class actions in our study. This prior work tends to
separate into two groups. The older vintage, including a study by
Professor Thomas Jones analyzing shareholder litigation in the 1971-
78 period 95  and one by Professor Roberta Romano analyzing
shareholder litigation between the late 1960s and 1987,96 present data
on shareholder litigation that includes both derivative suits and class
actions in state and federal courts. 97 The more recent studies have
95. Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder
Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REV. 542 (1980). Professor Jones includes
settlement information on 55 disputes that spawned 228 lawsuits which he divides into 3
categories: those producing monetary relief; those producing monetary relief for which a value
could not be calculated, and those without monetary relief. Id. at 547. He does not divide the
cases between derivative suits and class actions or between state and federal court, but a
majority of cases appear to be derivative and probably state claims. Among the 40 cases
producing monetary relief, 21 report recovery to the shareholders (suggesting a class action) and
19 report recovery to the corporation (suggesting a derivative claim). Id. at 548-51 tbl.III. The
other two categories appear from a limited description to be almost all derivative claims,
although several of the cases reflect the post-Watergate improper contributions claims that mix
federal and state claims. Id. at 556-62.
96. Romano, supra note 1, at 60. Romano's article reports that her data set includes 5
groups of cases of roughly the same size: 1) acquisitions, including challenges to friendly
mergers; 2) challenges to takeover defenses actions; 3) executive compensation and other self-
interested transactions; 4) misstatements or omissions in financial statements; 5) residual
claims. Id. In a letter to Professor Seligman, she reports that the data set of 128 settlements
includes 38 class actions, 50 derivative actions, 31 both class and derivative actions and 9 actions
by individual shareholders. Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 36
n.145 (1993) (reporting information from a letter to him from Professor Romano of Dec. 29,
1992). In the working paper that preceded the article, Professor Romano reports that about one-
fifth of the lawsuits (25 of 122) had no state claim and that 40 percent of cases with settlement
funds (16 of 40) arose under federal law. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE SHAREHOLDER SUIT:
LITIGATION WITHOUT FOUNDATION 74-75, tbls.11-12 (Yale Law Sch., Program in Civil Liab.,
Working Paper No. 130, 1990) (on file with authors).
97. Unfortunately, these studies do not always clearly distinguish between derivative and
class action suits, and instead sometimes refer to a single category of shareholder litigation. See,
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focused exclusively on federal securities class actions before and after
the 1995 Act.98 For the indicia of litigation agency costs discussed
supra Part I.B.1, the two sets of studies make similar findings,
suggesting that there is a core consistency in the two kinds of
representative suits. Here, we summarize some of the main results of
the most relevant studies.99  a
Most shareholder suits settle and very few are litigated on the
merits. The Jones and Romano studies, using data on all types of
shareholder suits filed, found that most of these actions settled out of
court. Using data from cases filed in the 1970s, Jones found that 74.7
percent of shareholder suits were resolved through out-of-court
settlement.100 Romano, using a broader data set from the 1970s and
1980s, similarly determined that 64.8 percent of shareholder suits
settled out of court. 10 1 This was considerably higher than what Wood
found for public companies in the 1930s and early 1940s. 10 2
For federal securities suits, one study of cases filed prior to
PSLRA found that "87.6 percent of the securities class actions filed
from April 1988 through September 1996 ended in settlement, with
the large majority of the remainder being resolved by dispositive
motions or voluntary dismissal."'03  A second study found that, in
1998, settlements comprised 85 percent of all dispositions of federal
e.g., WOOD, supra note 1, at 6-7; John E. Kennedy, Securities Class and Derivative Actions in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas: An Empirical Study, 14 HOUS. L.
REV. 769, 769 (1977).
98. See infra notes 104, 118.
99. We do not include any discussion of those studies that have focused on stock market
reaction to the filing or dismissal of shareholder litigation. See, e.g., Mark L. Cross et al., The
Impact of Directors and Officers'Liability Suits on Firm Value, 56 J. RISK & INS. 128, 131 (1989);
Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 277-83 (1986);
Kenneth E. Scott, The Role of Preconceptions in Policy Analysis in Law: A Response to Fischel
and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 299, 304-05 (1986).
100. Jones, supra note 95, at 545, 547.
101. Romano, supra note 1, at 60 & nn.7-8 (reporting 83 out of 128 resolved lawsuits settled;
there were an additional 11 suits still pending in Romano's sample). Professor Romano adjusts
Professor Jones's figures to reflect plaintiff suits voluntarily dropped, bringing the Jones and
Romano figures closer together.
102. WOOD, supra note 1, at 32 (reporting 16 percent settlement rate). Professor Hornstein
adjusted that data, but even as adjusted (29 percent) it remains much lower than the later
studies. Romano, supra note 1, at 60 n.7 (citing George D. Hornstein, The Death Knell of
Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CAL. L. REV. 123 (1944) (giving 31.5 percent as
the percentage for recoveries in suits involving publicly held companies)). Professor Romano
attributes the changes to court approval of settlements in representative actions and the
availability of D&O (director and officer) insurance. Id.
103. JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & MICHAEL A. PERINO, STANFORD LAW SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION
CLEARINGHOUSE, SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM: THE FIRST YEAR'S EXPERIENCE § IX (1997)
(footnote omitted), http://securities.stanford.edu/researchlstudies/19970227firstyr-firstyr.html.
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securities class action suits, although between January and June of
1999, that percentage dropped to 79 percent. 10 4
Because so many cases settle, few cases are litigated on the
merits. Of the 32 cases that were adjudicated in the Romano study,
only two, or about 6.25 percent, resulted in favorable outcomes for the
plaintiffs. 10 5 The Jones study calculated the percentage of cases
resulting in judgment for the plaintiffs, and found that of the 88
sample cases adjudicated by the courts, two resulted in plaintiff
judgments. 0 6  These values could be explained by defendants
vigorously defending strong cases, while settling weak ones.10 7
Furthermore, even though a small number of shareholder lawsuits get
resolved by trial, the courts may nonetheless play a monitoring
function because they have to approve each settlement. 108
Most cases produce some relief for shareholders, although it is
usually small when measured on a per share basis. Most plaintiffs
obtain at least some form of relief, again, mostly through
settlement. 09 This led Professor Jones to conclude, "the notion that
shareholder plaintiffs rarely obtain relief is clearly a myth."" 0
Professor Romano interprets the same pattern of settlements to reflect
a less rosy picture, noting that average payouts in derivative
settlements with monetary recovery are $0.18/share, or about 2
percent of the stock's price."' Her data show a median total recovery
104. TODD S. FOSTER ET AL., TRENDS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION AND THE IMPACT OF PSLRA 6
fig. 10 (2000).
105. Romano, supra note 1, at 60 n.8. Both cases settled after favorable rulings for the
plaintiffs. Id.
106. Jones, supra note 95, at 545. This study appears to have classified all settlements
together even if they occurred after adjudications by the court.
107. Id. at 546-47.
108. Romano, supra note 1, at 57. However, courts may "rarely scrutinize settlements and,
consequently, attorneys' incentives are the key factor in shareholder litigation." Id. (citing John
Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985)).
109. Jones, supra note 95, at 545 (noting that despite the high incidence in which
shareholders obtain relief, 75.3 percent, it cannot be said that plaintiffs won in any absolute
sense, asserting that "since an objectively fair recovery is often impossible to identify,
shareholder success in derivative and class action litigation can best be measured in terms of the
frequency with which they obtain some relief').
110. Id.
111. Romano, supra note 1, at 62. Romano found that in only half of the settlements do
shareholders obtain a financial recovery, and that "awards are paid to the attorneys far more
frequently than to shareholders." Id. Professors Romano and Jones also disagree on non-
monetary settlements. Compare id. at 63, with Jones, supra note 95, at 545. Romano
characterized such structural settlements as "inconsequential" and "cosmetic," and most likely
used to justify attorneys' fees awards. Romano, supra note 1, at 63. Additionally, she claims that
a review of such settlements does not provide evidence that shareholder litigation helps to deter
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for all shareholders of $2 million and an average recovery of $9
million.1 12  On this point, she breaks down her data between
derivative and class claims and finds that derivative claims (e.g.,
executive compensation and self-dealing) are settled for much less
than the class actions (e.g., financial disclosure and acquisitions
claims). 113 She also finds a difference between the types of suits as to
frequency of cash payouts in settlements-only 21 percent of
derivative actions result in cash settlements,11 4 but 67 percent of class
action lawsuits result in defendants paying investors cash when the
parties settle. 1 5 Romano finds the difference of interest, "because the
principal debate of the merits of shareholder litigation is focused on
derivative, not class actions."116
Similarly, Wood's study of the 1930s and early 1940s finds
small per share recoveries for shareholders from derivative actions in
both state and federal court. 117 For federal securities law cases in
recent years, data available on recovery as a percentage of damages
also depict a low percentage.11 8
Attorneys'fees are significant even if the shareholder recovery is
small. Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees are always paid in settlements, and
are usually significant, even when the plaintiffs' award is small or
non-monetary.1 19 In Jones' study, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees averaged
16.2 percent of the total plaintiff recovery, but ranged as high as 40.2
management misconduct, and corporations do not adjust management's compensation "in
response to lawsuits." Id. at 84.
112. Romano, supra note 1, at 61. Romano notes that there are two possible explanations for
this. The first is that most fiduciary breaches are minor and tend not to harm shareholders. Id.
The other is that a large proportion of shareholder suits are "without merit." Id.
113. Id. at 61 (finding average settlement amounts in class action suits to be $11 million,
while finding average settlement amounts in derivative suits to be $6 million).
114. Id. The per share recovery in derivative suits is small, and only "approximately 2
percent of the stock price on the day prior to the lawsuit's filing." Id. at 62.
115. Id. at 61. Per share recoveries in class action claims, although difficult to ascertain,
tend to be a little higher. Id. at 62 ("Computing per share recoveries in class actions is extremely
difficult because information on class size, individual members' losses, and hence their allotted
recovery is, for the most part, unavailable.").
116. Id. at 61.
117. WOOD, supra note 1, at 49-53.
118. DENISE N. MARTIN ET AL., NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., RECENT TRENDS IV: WHAT
EXPLAINS FILINGS AND SETrLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS? 10 tbl.7a (1996) (noting
the average settlement is 13.67 percent of plaintiffs' claimed damages); MUKESH BAJAJ ET AL.,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 26 tbl.9 (2000) (presenting
data showing low average ratios of different measures of loss to settlement value for 1991-1999),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=258027.
119. Jones, supra note 95, at 567. Attorney's fees in derivative and class action lawsuits "can
be quite substantial, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the recovery." Id. at 565.
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percent. 12° Wood's study of derivative suits in the 1930s and early
1940s found that plaintiffs' attorneys' fees ranged from 20 percent to
45 percent of the gross recovery.121 Romano's study found that
plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys' fees are comparable. 122
In federal securities suits, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in one
study averaged 31.84 percent of the settlement amount. 123 That
percentage is slightly higher for cases against high-technology
companies, with attorneys receiving a fee 32.38 percent of the
settlement amount. 124
Multiple lawsuits are often filed for the same alleged wrong.
Multiple lawsuits arising out of the same fact pattern are regularly
filed in shareholder representative litigation. Jones reports 2.6
lawsuits per disputed issue,1 25 while Romano's study found a
somewhat larger 3.6 ratio, with 506 lawsuits arising out of 139
disputed transactions.126 Wood's early study found that "[i]t has
become common for ten to twenty [derivative] actions to be brought,
and stayed or consolidated, and the procession only ended by [an]
injunction. . ." against further suits being filed. 127
Studies of federal securities claims reflect a similar pattern.
For example, in the Northern District of California from 1983 to 1984,
of the 111 securities class action filings, there were 35 different
instances in which multiple cases were filed against the same issuer
over the same alleged violations. 28 Similarly, in 1992, 265 securities
fraud complaints were reported filed against only 113 different
companies. 29 It was not uncommon, in some instances, to see as
120. Id. at 567. Jones noted that even where the plaintiffs recovery was trivial or non-
monetary, the attorneys still received their customary fees. Id.
121. WOOD, supra note 1, at 78-81.
122. Romano, supra note 1, at 65 (noting that "in virtually all of these lawsuits, the amounts
expended on legal fees by defendants were considerable, often in the same range as the costs").
Attorneys' fees are usually paid for by the corporation's D&O insurance, and not by the
managers or directors who are sued. Id. at 56, 84.
123. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 118, at 15 tbl.12b.
124. Id. at 14 tbl.12a.
125. Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative
and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B.U. L. REV. 306, 313 (1980).
126. Romano, supra note 1, at 59 n.4.
127. WOOD, supra note 1, at 68. Wood claims that these multiple suits were filed by
attorneys trying to insure that they would get between 5 and 10 percent of the fees awarded to
the lead counsel as a reward for their actions. Id. at 82.
128. Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings
Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 33 n.59 (1993).
129. Id.
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many as 15 complaints filed raising the same allegations, which would
then be consolidated by the court into a single class action.130
These suits tend to be filed by a small number of law firms and
plaintiffs who own only a small amount of stock. Wood's study of the
1930s found that shareholder suits were brought by a small number of
law firms and attorneys, 13' and that plaintiff shareholders in
derivative actions owned only a de minimis amount of stock in the
defendant corporation. 32 Prior to the passage of PSLRA, it was
generally understood that Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes, & Lerach
("Milberg Weiss") played a leading role as plaintiffs' class action
counsel. During the period from April 1988 through September 1996,
Milberg Weiss represented clients in approximately 31.4 percent of
842 class action securities fraud cases nationwide.133  Since the
passage of the Act, Milberg Weiss appears to have become even more
dominant in securities class action. Between December 22, 1995 and
December 31, 1996, out of the 109 securities class action proceedings
in federal court, Milberg Weiss appeared in 51 of the suits, which
equates to 43.8 percent. 34 Moreover, between the passage of the
Reform Act and December 2001, Milberg Weiss was involved in 51.5
percent of all settled cases. 135
Suits are filed quickly. Prior to the passage of PSLRA,
securities fraud suits were filed quickly after the announcement of
adverse news about the targeted company. 36 Legislative history
accompanying the 1995 Act describes "cookie-cutter complaints" filed
"within hours or days" of substantial drops in the company's stock
price. 137
Cases typically take years to resolve. This is a characteristic
that has been shown for the federal securities class actions. Prior to
the passage of PSLRA, an average of 2.67 percent of the federal
130. GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 103, § II.
131. WOOD, supra note 1, at 57 (more than 60 percent of the "more substantial cases" were
filed by a group of 14 attorneys or firms).
132. Id. at 50-53 (presenting data on cases in which there was a recovery showing that
plaintiff shareholders in these derivative actions owned only a de minimis amount of stock in the
defendant corporation.) However, another study that looked at shareholder suits in Dallas,
Texas, found that the investment shareholder plaintiffs held in the defendant corporation ranged
from $2,000 to $500,000. Kennedy, supra note 97, at 819-20 tbl.10.
133. GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 103, § VII.
134. Id.
135. LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM ACT SECURITIES
LAWSUITS: SETTLEMENTS REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2001, at 10 fig.8 (2002),
http://www.cornerstone.com/framres.html.
136. John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 375 (1996).
137. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, at 16 (1995).
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securities fraud cases settled within one year. 138 If we expand this
time frame outward to two years, we find 18.54 percent of these
federal cases settling, with this number continuing to increase, so that
after four years 57.59 percent of these federal class actions had
settled.139 After PSLRA, less than 1 percent of these cases settled
within one year, and only 11.58 percent of these actions settled in less
than two years. 140 Looking at settlement rates further out, only 26.06
percent of these cases were settled four years after filing.141
High-tech companies are sued most often. This focus on
particular companies is evident in the more recent data relevant to
federal securities class actions. High-tech companies make up the
largest percentage of companies being sued in securities class actions.
For example, in 1995, high-technology companies were targeted by
about 21 percent of all federal securities class actions filings.1 42
Between 1996 and 1998, this percentage increased to 36 percent of all
federal securities fraud class actions, then dipped slightly to .35
percent in 1999.'14 No other industry was hit with even half as many
of these suits.
With these indicators developed in prior work in mind, we next
ask what differences we might expect to find with acquisition-oriented
class actions and their litigation agency costs.
3. State Law Acquisition Class Action and Litigation Agency Costs
Shareholder litigation against public companies in the
acquisition setting is different in some respects than in the previously
discussed derivative and federal securities fraud settings. For one
thing, the time periods for state law acquisition-oriented cases may be
more compressed than other forms of shareholder litigation because
the suits are tied to the completion of an announced transaction. This
means that the litigation may need to proceed very rapidly in tandem
with the transaction if the shareholders are to obtain timely relief.
Furthermore, the litigation may be a barrier to the completion
of the proposed transaction. This gives the acquirer stronger
incentives to offer to settle the case by improving the terms of the
consideration offered to the shareholders of the target company and
thereby to insure that the transaction closes. Plaintiffs' counsel may
138. BAJAJ ET AL., supra note 118, at 17 tbl.2.
139. Id.
140. Id. (study of cases filed 1996-99).
141. Id.
142. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 118, at 13-14 tbl.10c.
143. FOSTER ET AL., supra note 104, at 5 fig.7.
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also be able to convince an acquirer to make significant corporate
governance changes in order to accelerate completion of the deal.
The potential for high litigation agency costs in these cases
may also be different from that experienced in derivative and
securities fraud litigation. While plaintiffs' counsel often claim full
responsibility for any benefits to the class that arise after the filing of
their complaints, it may be the case that events unrelated to the
litigation are responsible for improvements in the terms offered in
these transactions. For example, if a Special Committee of a target
company's board of directors negotiates an increase in the offer price
from an acquiring majority shareholder without any assistance from
the plaintiffs' class counsel, the court may still award substantial, but
unjustified, attorneys' fees to the attorneys that (indirectly) reduce the
payments to the shareholders. Delaware, however, has not adopted
any special safeguards against litigation agency costs in these class
actions other than the typicality and adequacy requirements that exist
for all class actions.144
More directly, in a subset of acquisition class action suits,
namely those brought in a hostile takeover setting or where a second
bid has been made after the announcement of a friendly deal, there
may also be a direct action brought by the frustrated bidder in a
hostile takeover attempt or by a second bidder if there is already an
existing friendly bid on the table. These suits can exist alongside of
representative suits brought on behalf of the class of shareholders. 145
For the bidder suits alone, commentators have not raised concerns
about litigation agency cost problems. Instead, the focus has been on
the importance of the market for corporate control as a means of
controlling managerial agency costs.
These bidder suits are different from other forms of
shareholder litigation in that they can succeed even when there is no
settlement or favorable court judgment. Instead, success is measured
by whether the acquisition closes, not by the litigation outcome. For
the representative litigation accompanying these bidder suits, though,
the class counsel should not expect to obtain a favorable settlement
unless the bidder's lawsuit is successful. Even then, a winning hostile
bidder may refuse to offer the class anything more than what the
bidder would pay anyway in the offer, and may pay no attorneys' fees
to class counsel unless the bidder believes that these attorneys helped
to change the outcome of the case. Thus, as we turn to our empirical
144. For a discussion of the typicality and adequacy requirements, see supra text
accompanying note 72.
145. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1141-42 (Del.
1990) (including claims made by a shareholder class and Paramount, the frustrated bidder).
[Vol. 5 7: 1
2004] THE NEW LOOK OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 165
analysis, one important question we must keep in mind is to what
extent does representative litigation have a contribution to make
when there is bidder litigation filed too?
II. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION IN DELAWARE
The data in this article provide the most complete survey of
state shareholder litigation. Our data set is comprised of all
complaints filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1999 and 2000.
Delaware is the preeminent state of incorporation for public
corporations in the United States and for decades has had the best-
known corporate courts and corporation code. For generations, its
courts have issued decisions in class actions, derivative lawsuits, and
direct cases filed by investors against a multitude of public and
private corporations seeking to remedy every imaginable violation of
corporate law and norms. Corporate cases are heard exclusively by its
Court of Chancery, whose Chancellor and four Vice-Chancellors, along
with the five Delaware Supreme Court justices that hear appeals from
Chancery Court decisions, give the state a bench that is nationally
renowned for corporate expertise and has a reputation that is
unmatched by any other state or federal court. Its docket is the center
of shareholder litigation in this country.146
A. Overview of the Data: Delaware Court of Chancery Cases 1999 and
2000
We begin with a census of the Delaware Court of Chancery's
caseload for 1999 and 2000.147 A brief glance at Table 1A reveals that
146. Academics split roughly into two camps about the role of Delaware and shareholder
litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery in controlling managerial agency costs. Those that
subscribe to the view that Delaware corporate law is the leader in a "race to the bottom" believe
that shareholder litigation is an important check on managerial abuses but that the Delaware
law and its courts stifle shareholder complaints and facilitate managerial abuses of investors.
See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974). By contrast, those claiming that Delaware law is leading a "race to the top" hold
out shareholder litigation as a product of entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorneys whose cases are
thrown out of court by Delaware judges, who thereby perform a valuable and needed service. See,
e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). The literature that this debate has generated is voluminous. For a
summary of much of the early work, see ROMANO, supra note 13, . More recently, Professor Roe
has suggested that Delaware competes with the federal government, not other states. Mark J.
Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 600-34 (2003).
147. There are three branches of the Chancery Court: one in New Castle County, one in Kent
County, and one in Sussex County. Each branch has its own clerk's office, the Registrar in
Chancery. Our research found that the Chancery Court for New Castle County is where the
overwhelming majority of corporate law complaints is filed. With the assistance of the Registrars
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75 percent of the civil actions filed in the New Castle County
Chancery Court are classified as corporate matters (1280 of 1716),148 a
number that will surprise no one who is familiar with that court. The
remaining 25 percent of the civil actions reflect that court's less well-
known jurisdiction over other matters of equity such as trusts and
estates or complaints seeking injunctive relief in a variety of non-
corporate matters for alleged harms. 149
If we look more closely at the corporate docket, we find in Table
1B that almost 80 percent of the complaints filed (1003 of 1280) raised
questions of fiduciary duty that are the subject of this article, while
the remaining cases address a variety of more discrete corporate
issues (we will discuss these cases in more detail in section C below).
Fiduciary duty litigation thus comprised approximately 60 percent of
the New Castle County Chancery Court's entire caseload. 150
Table 1A: The Data Set-All Delaware Court of Chancery Cases 1999
& 2000
in Chancery's offices in Kent and Sussex counties, we went through their files for all of 1999 and
2000, and examined all cases with corporate defendants. We found no complaints filed in Sussex
County branch of the Court of Chancery that fell within the range of our search for fiduciary
duty cases. We found three cases in Kent Court, two of which would come under the statutory
categories and one that was a pro se petition including a breach of fiduciary duty allegation in a
list of many other charges. That case is not included in the data presented here. Rather, we use
only the data from the New Castle County Chancery Court for this study, which we believe to be
the best indicator of corporate litigation in this country.
148. For this project, we read each of the 1325 complaints that were designated as corporate
in the Chancery Court's filing system for New Castle County. We identified 45 that did not
directly raise corporate law issues, such as insurance or agency disputes, etc., and these were
added to the non-corporate count.
149. The Chancery Court is a court of equity in which all Delaware corporate cases originate.
It was formed in 1792, and is the oldest of the Delaware courts. DEL. STATE BAR ASS'N, THE
DELAWARE BAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 395 (Helen L. Winslow ed., 1994). As a court of
equity, its judges decide cases without a jury. See generally COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE
OF DELAWARE-1792-1992 (1992) for essays about the distinctive characteristics of that court.
Although its subject matter jurisdiction is largely concentrated in the corporate area, the
Chancery Court also hears cases involving will contests, estate disputes, and property fights.
These cases do not involve shareholder litigation, and so we have not included them in our
sample.
150. This figure is calculated by dividing the 1,003 fiduciary cases by a total of 1,716
complaints filed.
Total Complaints filed 1716
Corporate 1280
(75%)
Non Corporate 436
(25%)
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Table 1B: Breakdown of Corporate Cases
Total Corporate Cases 1280
Fiduciary Duty 1003
(78%)
Statutory & Other 277(22%)
B. The Fiduciary Duty Claims
Fiduciary duty cases are the heart of shareholder litigation
under corporate law. Fiduciary duty is designed as a legal rule to
permit judges to apply core principles after the fact to a broad variety
of situations in which managers may have misused the centralized
power given them by the statutory structure. The core claims raised
in these cases revolve around the familiar principles of the duty of
loyalty, the duty of care, good faith, and the business judgment rule.
Such claims have arisen over the years in an almost infinite variety of
circumstances, ranging from the corporate opportunity doctrine to the
duty to create internal corporate controls.
While fiduciary duty claims within their historical context
suggest a wide-ranging coverage, Table 2 shows that today the
overwhelmingly majority of fiduciary litigation in Delaware is in the
form of challenges to director actions taken in the context of the sale of
a company. That table shows the following:
Almost all shareholder litigation in Delaware is against public
companies (91 percent: 952 of 1048). That conclusion will likely
surprise few readers but it shows the strong public corporation focus
of Delaware corporate law.
The vast majority of the fiduciary duty claims against public
companies are class actions (85 percent: 808 of 952). Thus, for public
companies, class actions outnumber derivative suits by a margin of
almost 8-1. Derivative suits, the traditional receptacle for fiduciary
duty litigation, make up a higher percentage of fiduciary duty suits
versus private companies (28 percent, 26 of 93), but for private
companies the bulk of fiduciary duty litigation occurs by way of direct
suits (51 of 93 or 55 percent). Derivative suits against public
corporations occur in less than 30 transactions each year. Derivative
suits, in the aggregate, are focused on manager conflict-of-interest
transactions, both in an acquisition setting and otherwise. About half
of the derivative suits raise questions about improper benefits to
managers. Another 18 percent, all in the context of close corporations,
167
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
allege oppression of minority investors by a majority. Less than 20
percent raise questions about improper financial records or other
matters related to management's care in running the enterprise
outside of an acquisition context.151
Almost all (94 percent: 772 of 824) class action suits arise in an
acquisition setting whereas almost all (90 percent: 123 of 137) of the
derivative suits arise in a non-acquisition setting. Thus, the data
reveal the extent to which the different suits do different things.
Derivative suits are addressed to self-dealing and similar settings and
class actions are the remedy of choice for an acquisition claim even if,
as shown below, many of them also raise a self-dealing issue.
While there is more to be said on derivative claims, our focus in
this paper is on class actions, which are by far the largest segment of
the data set. 152 Put a different way, class actions make up almost all
of the suits brought against public corporations, and class actions
themselves are almost always brought against public corporations.
Class actions virtually all arise in an acquisition setting and make up
an even higher percentage of cases stemming from acquisitions.
Before going further, we should note that it is not unusual in
representative litigation to see multiple complaints filed concerning
the same transaction, as law firms jockey for a piece of the action.
While we discuss this phenomenon more fully later in the paper, 153 we
provide in the right hand columns of Table 2 the breakdown for just
the lead complaints in our data. These data reflect the fact that the
Chancery Court will order consolidation of all cases attacking the
same transaction, thereby combining any instances where multiple
complaints are filed into one action.
The main result of looking at lead complaints is to moderate
some of the trends just discussed. Over the two-year period that we
studied, there were 348 lead complaints in the Chancery Court,
roughly 61 percent (213) of which were acquisition-oriented class
actions against public companies. By comparison, if we look at the
151. Of 83 lead cases that are derivative suits, 45 allege benefit to managers and 15 allege
oppression to minority shareholders. Ten challenge acquisition transactions, many of which also
raise a conflict question as to the directors and one challenges the actions of a manager in a
charter amendment. Less than 20 percent (16 of 83) raise questions of improper financial
records or duty to supervise and an additional three cases raised questions of misleading
statements. Four cases fell into "other." For public companies only, the number of lead cases
drop to 56, the number raising claims about benefit to managers is 27 (48 percent), the number
raising financial records or misleading statements is 19 (34 percent) and the number raising
acquisition claims drops to 8 (14.2 percent).
152. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Litigation, 57 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
153. See infra tbl. 10 and accompanying discussion.
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number of lead complaints filed in federal securities fraud actions, we
find that in 1999 a total of 219 such actions were brought, while in
2000 there were 202 federal securities fraud complaints filed.154
Table 2: Types of Fiduciary Duty Actions 155
FIDUCIARY
DUTY CASES
Acquisition Non-
Acauisition
1048 1 813 1 235
CLASS ACTIONS 824 772 52
Public Entity 808 765 43
Private Entity 16 7 9
DERIVATIVE 137 14 123
Public Entity 108 12 96
Private Entity 26 2 24
Not Available 3 0 3
DIRECT 87 27 60
Public Entity 36 19 17
Private Entity 51 8 43
Acquisition Non-
Acouisition
348 213 135
223 196 27
213 194 19
10 2 8
M 9 74
56 7 49
25 2 23
2 0 2
74 18 56
25 10 15
19 8 41
C. A Brief Overview of the Remaining Corporate Caseload
Before moving on to discuss more fully the fiduciary duty cases
in our sample, we want to briefly describe the remaining corporate
cases, which comprise just over one-fifth of our sample. These
complaints raise a variety of statutory and contractual claims. 156
Expedited statutory proceedings under sections 211, 220, and 225 of
the Delaware Corporate Code are the most important category of
these cases, with the most frequent (66 cases) being shareholders
154. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 913, 930 tbl.1 (2003).
155. The three types of suits total 1048, which is 45 more than the total number of
complaints because a few suits have both class and derivative counts (22); or derivative and
direct counts in their complaints (15); or class and direct counts (2); or class, derivative, and
direct counts in the same complaint (3).
156. We recognize that in the course of resolving some of these disputes, the Chancery Court
will undoubtedly need to resolve many issues that involve determinations about fiduciary duties.
This is especially true for proceedings under section 225 and section 211. However, these cases
are sufficiently different from the suits that we are addressing in this paper that we do not
include them in our analysis here.
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seeking to inspect books and records under section 220 of the code. 15 7
The other two expedited proceedings shown are designed to resolve
important corporate governance questions, with section 211 claims
filed by shareholders seeking to compel an annual meeting (21 cases)
and section 225 proceedings instituted to determine contests over who
the directors are within the corporation (39 cases). 158
There are three other types of statutory cases worth
mentioning briefly. Appraisal proceedings make up a very small
portion of the Chancery Court docket (about 1 percent or 22 cases out
of the two year total of 1716 cases filed), which is consistent with
earlier research finding that appraisal is a little-used remedy in
Delaware. 159  Indemnification litigation under section 145 of the
Delaware Corporate Code constitutes an even smaller percentage of
the cases in the sample, only 12 cases total. Finally, actions involving
the various code provisions relating to winding up the corporation's
business (including dissolution, appointment of a receiver, and
appointment of a custodian) occupy a larger piece of the statutory
caseload, with 45 cases (or about 2.5 percent of the total docket of the
court). The other two categories of cases shown on Table 3 are
contract cases (33 cases) 160 and claims to determine stock ownership
(26).161
The cases shown in Table 3 typically are not representative
cases, but rather direct suits brought by an individual shareholder.
Some of these kinds of statutory cases have been written about
elsewhere. 162 In this paper, we focus our attention on fiduciary duty
suits and the problems of representative litigation.
157. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2001). This category includes parallel claims to access
brought under the Limited Partnership statutes.
158. This category includes parallel cases about determining managers in LLCs.
159; Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1, 22
(2000) (finding that from 1977 to 1997 a total of 266 appraisal cases were filed in the Delaware
Chancery Court, or an average of fewer than 14 cases per year).
160. These cases represent a small but potentially very important aspect of the Chancery
Court's caseload. In recent years, the Court has permitted parties to a contract that has
otherwise no connection to Delaware to select the Chancery Court as the forum to decide all
disputes arising under the terms of their agreement. These choice of forum clauses are popular
because the Chancery Court provides fast, expert decisions in resolving these matters.
161. The contractual claims, for example, grow out of shareholders' agreements. Thus, the
contract category and the stock ownership category overlap somewhat and include pre-emptive
rights cases and valuation of shares where there is a contract to purchase.
162. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 159 (appraisal); Randall S. Thomas, Improving
Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access to
Information, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 331 (1996) (books & records); Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity,
and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1 (1995) (appraisal).
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Table 3: Non-Fiduciary Claims in Delaware
Books & Records (§ 220) 66
Dissolution, Receiver & Custodian 45
(§ 279 et seq.)
Determining Directors (§ 225) 39
Contract 33
Stock Ownership 26
Appraisal (§ 262) 22
Compelling Shareholder Meeting 21
(§ 211)
Indemnification (§ 145) 12
Other 16
Total Non-Fiduciary 279
D. Who Gets Sued in Fiduciary Duty Litigation?
As we saw above, fiduciary duty lawsuits largely target public
companies. If we break out the types of defendants in these cases,
though, some interesting patterns emerge. Table 4 shows the
breakdown of these statistics both for the number of complaints filed
and, in the right columns, the number of lead cases filed. First, we
can see that most shareholder litigation targets the largest companies.
Of the cases in our data set, over 56 percent of the complaints filed,
and over 35 percent of the complaints in lead cases, name New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) companies as defendants. NASDAQ
companies are named in about 25 percent of the cases, or about 28
percent of the lead cases. 163 Together, NYSE and NASDAQ companies
make up over 81 percent of the companies named as defendants in our
complaints, and roughly 64 percent of the defendants named in lead
cases.
163. The differences in the percentages of NYSE and NASDAQ companies in our sample
could potentially reflect a different percentage of NYSE companies than NASDAQ companies
being incorporated in Delaware, or it could reflect differences in the level of acquisitions that the
two groups engage in.
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Table 4: Type of Entity Sued 64
r'ype ot I ) ...........Entity .............. ' i! oiNYE 567 1533
NASDAQ 249 218 132 1
Small 107 77 24 1
Public165
Non-Public 77 16 26 51
Unspecified 3 0 3 0
Total 1003 824 137 87
Z4 V6~ Zt tb
9 81 16 8
5 34 14 13
8 10 25 50
0 3 0
48 213 83 77
Once we disaggregate these figures and look separately at class
actions, derivative suits, and direct suits, we see some important
differences in who gets sued in these actions. The class actions target
the largest companies in our sample. This is not surprising given who
is involved in acquisitions.
While the class actions are almost always brought against
publicly held companies, derivative suits are more evenly distributed,
with about 70 percent against publicly held corporations and 30
percent naming closely held companies. 66 If we look at direct suits,
about 65 percent of these complaints list private entities as
defendants. There are many reasons to think that suits by minority
investors in private companies are different from those filed by small
investors in public companies. 16 7
If we focus solely on the public company cases for a moment,
we find that derivative lawsuits are generally filed against larger
public companies. The median market cap for public companies that
are subject to derivative suits is $1.138 billion, with the 25th
percentile at $219.5 million and the 75th percentile at $6.15 billion. 68
This cap is substantially larger than for class actions, where the
164. Some complaints included class, derivative, and direct counts and have been counted in
each category so the sum in the three categories exceeds the total number of cases. See supra
note 155.
165. This category includes companies listed on the Amex, the NASDAQ small cap, or over-
the-counter listings, and a few corporations that we identified as public, but for which we could
not ascertain where the shares were traded.
166. See supra tbl.2.
167. Thomas & Martin, supra note 69, at 600-02 (listing examples of differences between
closely held and publicly owned corporations).
168. This is influenced upward by the derivative suits for improper financial records, failure
to supervise, and misleading statements, which are usually filed against very large companies.
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median sized defendant has a market capitalization of $389 million, a
25th percentile at $118 million and a 75th percentile at $1.39 billion.
Derivative cases are brought more often against NYSE
companies than NASDAQ companies. Derivative cases differ from the
class action cases in that the derivative cases contain a substantial
subset that are brought against closely held companies, illustrating
that derivative litigation has a distinctive role in privately held
companies.
There are some other interesting distinguishing characteristics
of derivative litigation. The companies that are sued in derivative
suits are less likely to be headquartered in California than the
companies in class action suits, with the Golden State companies
making up only 10 percent of the derivative cases (vs. 16 percent of
the class actions). 169 Internet and computer companies make up about
19 percent of the derivative sample, in the same range as with class
actions but lower than what has been observed for securities fraud
cases.170 There is, however, little reason to expect the same pattern
among the defendants in our cases as in the federal cases, since our
class actions are challenging the terms of acquisitions, while the
federal class actions are alleging securities fraud, frequently in the
IPO context.
E. Acquisition Cases: Friendly, Hostile, Arm's Length and Control
Shareholder Transactions.
Our sample contains a wide variety of complaints challenging
director action in a sale of corporate control. These cases typically
allege that directors have failed to get enough money in a friendly
merger or other fundamental corporate transaction that management
has proposed, or have failed to respond adequately to a proposed
hostile bid. Focusing first on the data for all complaints filed, Table 5
shows that the most common acquisition cases (about 31 percent of
the acquisition complaints) involve claims that a controlling
shareholder violated its fiduciary duties to minority shareholders
when the controlling shareholder initiated a merger or other
169. The number of derivative suits filed against companies headquartered in particular
states is as follows: New York - 9; California and Massachusetts - 8; Delaware - 7; Illinois - 5;
nine states with 2; and another nine states with 1. There were 83 companies in this set. The
headquarters of the remaining defendants were unknown.
170. Grundfest and Perino estimate that 34 percent of securities fraud complaints post-
PLRA name high-technology companies as defendants. Grundfest & Perino, supra note 89, at tbl.
8. In our sample of derivative suits, the numbers are: internet & computers-15; banking &
finance-ll; health care-8; retail-7; real estate & manufacturing-6 each; entertainment &
telecom-3 each; and various others with 1 or 2 for a total of 83.
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fundamental corporate change, such as a tender offer or various two-
step transitions. These cases raise obvious conflict-of-interest issues.
In these cases, the allegations are that a greater than 50 percent
shareholder is using majority power to cash out the minority at an
unfair price, or through unfair dealings.
Two other types of friendly deals, management buyout
proposals (MBOs) and sales to a friendly third party, each generate
about 23 percent of the complaints shown on Table 5. The MBO cases
raise conflict-of-interest claims because of the potential for the target
company's board of directors to give its managers special preferences
in a sale of control. The third-party transactions raise less obvious
conflict-of-interest concerns, such as the possibility that managers
received better treatment than other shareholders by receiving side
payments from the bidder.
Hostile transactions, or multiple bidder situations, generate
much less litigation. Only 80 complaints, or about 10 percent of the
acquisitions cases, arise out of a hostile offer. 171 Second bidder cases,
which involve situations where a second bidder emerged after
management announced a friendly deal to be acquired, account for
another 13 percent of the cases. The relative scarcity of these cases
may reflect a variety of factors, including the reduced likelihood of a
sweetheart deal at a low price in a hostile or competitive bidding
situation.
There are relatively few derivative and direct complaints filed
in the acquisition context. Ten of the 27 direct acquisition lead actions
are complaints filed by bidders either in hostile transactions or in
second bidder situations. Of the remaining direct acquisition
complaints, the largest number challenge director action in control
shareholder transactions.
Narrowing the focus to lead complaints shifts the pattern of
distribution slightly. Third-party transactions now outnumber control
shareholder acquisitions among lead cases. Hostile bidder lead cases
now outnumber second bidder filings, reflecting the extraordinarily
large number of multiple complaints that are filed in second bidder
situations (averaging almost 10 complaints for each transaction!). 172
171. There are 23 lead cases involving hostile acquisitions, which also represents about 10
percent of the total number of lead cases.
172. While a large number of complaints filed in second bidder cases might be hypothesized
to reflect either a strong legal claim or a high expected return to the plaintiffs' attorneys, in fact,
we find neither to be the case. For further discussion of this point, see infra Part III. B. 3.
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Table 5: Contexts for Acquisition Cases 173
Type of T : .... ....
Transaction Vt M
Control 18 18 4 5
Shareholder
Acquisition
MBO type 17 77 01
transaction
Third-Party 17 82 45
Acquisition
Second Bidder 107 101 1 5
Deals
Hostile 80 74 7 6
Transactions
Total 799 772 14 27
Acquisition 1 _ _ 1
[2 42 0 1
72 67 3 5
-1 10 0 1
13 21 4 2
23 196 9 18
F. Frequency of Relief
How frequently does shareholder litigation result in benefits to
shareholders? In Table 6, we provide data on the disposition of the
lead cases in our sample. There are 348 lead cases involving breach of
fiduciary duty claims that were litigated in the Chancery Court in
1999 and 2000, with about two-thirds of them being acquisition cases
and the remainder non-acquisition cases.
There are statistically significant differences in the dispositions
of acquisition cases (largely class actions) and non-acquisition cases
(mostly derivative actions). For example, class actions are resolved
much more quickly, on average, than derivative suits. While about 20
percent of the sample cases were still pending at the time this table
was prepared, if we compare the two groups of cases, we see almost
two-thirds of these pending cases are non-acquisition cases. In other
words, the non-acquisition cases that make up just 38 percent of all
lead cases account for 64 percent of the cases remaining open. These
differences are statistically significant (with a P-value of less than .01)
Similarly large significant differences exist between the
frequency with which acquisition and non-acquisition lead cases are
173. The total number is less than the sum of the three types of complaints because some
complaints included class, derivative, and/or direct counts in their complaints.
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dismissed without prejudice and with no relief: acquisition cases are
dismissed without prejudice over 53 percent of the time, while non-
acquisition cases fall in this category in roughly 22 percent of the lead
cases. This difference is statistically significant (with a P-value of less
than .01). In the same vein, if we look at the frequency of dismissal
with prejudice and no relief, we see the opposite pattern: non-
acquisition cases are much more likely to be dismissed with prejudice
(about 27 percent of the lead cases) than acquisition cases, which show
up in this group only about 5 percent of the time. Again, these
differences are statistically significant (with a P-value of less than
.01). Finally, acquisition lead cases are statistically significantly more
likely to result in settlements with relief than non-acquisition cases
(with a P-value of less than .05).
The explanation for these very different patterns may be found
in the differences in the intensity of actual litigation in the two types
of cases. One unusual aspect of the acquisition-oriented class action
lawsuits is the lack of much actual litigation activity in them. Most of
these suits are filed and then sit without activity until they are either
settled or dismissed.174 One measure of this inactivity is the
infrequency with which substantive motions, such as a motion to
dismiss for failure to make demand, a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, or a motion for summary judgment, are filed.
There are more substantive motions filed in derivative actions
than in class action litigation. Thus we see that in 53 of 83 (63.8
percent) of the lead derivative cases we find substantive motions being
filed, whereas such motions are made in class actions in only 96 of 223
lead cases (43.0 percent). Overall, derivative litigation looks more like
real litigation than the class actions. 175
This suggests that the difference in the dismissal patterns for
the two types of suits may be the result of very different underlying
litigation strategies by plaintiffs' counsel. Since dismissals without
prejudice are normally voluntary, it could be that class actions are
much more likely to be dropped by plaintiffs' counsel if they fail to
produce prompt relief. Derivative cases are more likely to be hard
174. This is consistent with civil litigation generally. See Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice
Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2095 (2002) (reporting studies finding no discovery in 38
percent, 42 percent, or half of cases of various studies.).
175. These differences should not be hastily interpreted as evidence that class actions are
frivolous though. If the point of filing a complaint is to raise the price that is paid in the
transaction, and filing a strong claim is sufficient to engage the bidder in negotiations to
accomplish that objective successfully, then there would be little point in filing a lot of motions
for the parties to brief.
[Vol. 57:1176
2004] THE NEW LOOK OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 177
fought, and, therefore, an unfavorable outcome will lead to an
involuntary dismissal.
Table 6: Disposition Status of Lead Cases
Lead Cases
Still Pending 68 (19.54%) 24 (11.26%) 44 (32.59%)
Dismissed 143 (41.09%) 113 (53.05%) 30 (22.22%)
Without
Prejudice and
With No Relief
Dismissed With 49 (14.08%) 13 (6.10%) 36 (26.67%)
Prejudice and
With No Relief
Settlement With 85 (24.42%) 60 (28.17%) 25 (18.51%)
Relief
Dismissal (No 3 (0.86%) 3 (1.4%) 0 (0%)
Information)
In Table 7, we look at the frequency with which settlements (or
other relief) occur in these lead cases. Once again, there appear to be
differences in how acquisition cases and non-acquisition cases are
settled. Here, we must use caution in interpreting these values due to
the relatively large number of cases that have yet to be resolved. To
be precise, we have 85 cases that have settled with some relief, but 67
cases that are still pending after at least twenty months. Since we
believe it is likely that a number of these longer lasting cases will
settle, the values reported in Table 7 are likely to shift.
Looking at the preliminary figures, though, some interesting
results appear. First, if we look at the total number of settlements, we
see that fiduciary duty cases have produced some form of relief in 85
lead cases, or about 24 percent of the total number of fiduciary duty
lead cases filed. There are sizeable differences between the
percentages of settlements in acquisition and non-acquisition lead
cases: about 28 percent of the acquisition cases are settled with relief,
while only roughly 18 percent of the non-acquisition cases resulted in
relief for the plaintiff shareholders. As noted above, this difference is
statistically significant (with a P-value of less than .05). The difference
is likely to shrink as only about 10 percent of the acquisition cases
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remain open while more than 30 percent of the non-acquisition cases
are still pending.
In Romano's 1991 study of shareholder litigation filed between
the late 1960s and 1987 (including both state and federal actions), she
found that 83 out of 128 resolved suits settled, with another 11 suits
pending. 176 If we assume that none of the other 11 suits resulted in
relief, then the lowest settlement rate possible in her data is about
59.7 percent. By comparison, if all 67 pending cases in our sample
settled with relief for shareholders, the highest possible settlement
rate for our database would be 43.7 percent. So there is at least an 16
percentage point decline in settlement rates between the two samples,
and probably higher. This seems to indicate a decline in the likelihood
of settlement of shareholder litigation from the earlier time period
(1967 to 1987) of Romano's data to the 1999-2000 time period in our
database.
What explains this apparent change? While there are many
potential explanations, one possibility is that more acquisition-
oriented representative class actions are filed today than were filed
during Romano's sample period. We speculate that there may have
been more merger and acquisition transactions in recent years, and
that information concerning them may be more widely available. Also,
for at least some portion of the earlier years in Romano's sample,
hostile acquisitions were rarely attempted. If more cases are filed, but
only the same number of good cases exist, then the average settlement
rate could fall.
A second possible explanation may be a shift in litigation
patterns from state court to federal court. The Delaware courts are
limited by federal law to accepting class actions in the acquisition
context and a few other well-defined areas. 177 This change in the law
may have resulted in many higher value cases moving out of state
court into federal court, thereby reducing the likelihood of settlement
in state court on average.
The underlying settlement patterns become clearer if we break
out cases according to whether the defendant is a public or private
entity: cases with public company defendants are much more likely to
result in settlements than those against private entities. If we look at
all lead cases, public company cases settle about 28.1 percent of the
time (78 out of 278), while private entity cases are settled in about
10.3 percent of the cases (7 out of 68). These differences are
statistically significant (with a P-value of less than .01). All of these
176. Romano, supra note 1, at 60.
177. See supra note 10.
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results must be viewed with caution, though, as a large number of
cases are still pending.
Table 7: Settlements or Other Relief in Lead Cases
'Total Number ot 346 213 13b
Lead Cases
Total Number of 85 60 25
Settlements
Settlements: 78 58 20
Publicly-held
defendant
Settlements: 7 2 5
Privately-held
defendant
Why would public company cases settle more frequently?
Again, there are a variety of possible explanations for this pattern.
Public firms may be more likely to have directors' and officers'
insurance coverage to pay for a settlement, or private entity litigation
may be more intensely personal and therefore affected by spite and
personal animosity. 178 There may also be institutional features of the
public company class action lawsuits, like the frequency with which
they are filed by the same set of law firms, which make them different
from the other cases in our database. We will return to this issue in
Part III below.
When we look more closely at the settlements entered into, we
see substantial variations in the cases that have been resolved. 179
Table 8 reports these data. First, the most common form of relief is a
cash award, which occurs in about half of these situations. These
settlements most commonly involve the payment of additional
consideration in an acquisition transaction. We discuss the features of
these settlements in more detail in Part III.B.
If we look at the size of these settlements, we find that the
median settlement in the 42 cases with monetary settlements is $15.0
178. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 69, at 586-87 (finding that in shareholder challenges
to executive pay practices, plaintiffs are more successful in private company litigation than
public company litigation).
179. As noted above, 67 cases are still pending.
179
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million. Acquisition cases have a higher median settlement ($15.4
million) than non-acquisition cases, in which the median is $11
million.
If we compare the size of these settlements with those obtained
in recent federal securities fraud cases, we see that the median
settlement in a federal securities fraud case during the period from
1996 to 2000 was $5 million.180 In 2001, this value rose to $5.4 million.
Clearly, the Delaware cases settle for more than the federal cases,
probably because the relief is usually additional consideration for
public shareholders in a current acquisition.181
Substantive relief other than cash is the second most common
form of relief. These non-monetary settlements include rescission of
contracts, corporate governance changes, and other relief. They make
up a greater share of the relief in the non-acquisition cases than in the
acquisition actions. S2 Additional disclosure is the only relief provided
in seven cases,18 3 while no identified relief other than attorneys' fees is
found in eight cases. The attorneys'-fees-only category mostly reflects
situations where the case was dismissed as moot after the bidder
raised the offer price (and in the absence of a binding contract to settle
the then-pending shareholder litigation).18 4 In that situation, courts
have refused to approve a settlement but have permitted the acquirer,
as a matter of business judgment, to pay money to resolve a
threatened or pending fee petition. 8 5
180. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP, 2002 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 2-3 (2002),
http://www.pwcglobal.com/us/eng/about/svcs/fas/2002%20securities%2Olitigation%20study.pdf.
For the period from 1996-2000, securities fraud cases alleging accounting fraud have
substantially larger median settlements in them ($7.15 million) than non-accounting cases ($3.5
million). Id. at 3.
181. See infra Part III.A.2 (noting that fewer of the Delaware cases settle than the federal
securities fraud cases).
182. Twenty-eight of the total 85 cases granted substantive relief other than additional
consideration. Of those 28 cases, 16 were acquisition and 12 were non-acquisition. Of the 85 total
cases, 60 were acquisition cases and 25 were non-acquisition cases. Therefore, these non-
monetary settlements were the type of relief obtained in 16 of 60 (21 percent) of the acquisition
cases, and 12 of 25 (48 percent) of the non-acquisition cases.
183. Cases where additional disclosure was ordered along with other substantive relief are
recorded in the previous category.
184. We note that in these cases the company did what the plaintiffs had asked them to do,
and it could be the case that it did so at least in part because of the lawsuit. Thus, the suit
probably advanced meritorious claims and may well have yielded benefits.
185. In re Advanced Mammography Sys., Inc. S'holder Litig., No. CIV.A.14831, 1996 WL
633409, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 1996); see also United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. Takecare, Inc., 693
A.2d 1076 (Del. 1997) (recognizing the propriety of a fee award to plaintiff counsel in action
rendered moot by acts of the defendant that benefit the class and are causally related to the
litigation). For an example of such a case in this data set, see In re Cellular Communications
Int'l, Inc. S'holders Litig., 752 A.2d 1185 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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Table 8: Type of Relief Obtained in Settlements
Additional
Consideration
(Median $)
42
($15.0
million)
31
($15.4
million)
11($11
million)
Substantive 28 16 12
Relief Other
than Additional
Consideration
Additional 7 6 1
Disclosure, but
No $
Attorneys' Fees 8 7 1
Only
Total 85 60 25
With our overview of the data fresh in mind, we turn next to
our reexamination of the balance between managerial agency costs
and litigation agency costs in shareholder class actions involving
acquisitions.
III. ACQUISITION-ORIENTED CLASS ACTIONS: ARE THEIR MANAGERIAL
AGENCY COST REDUCTION BENEFITS GREATER THAN THEIR
LITIGATION AGENCY COSTS?
One of the most surprising findings of this study is the
tremendous number of acquisition-oriented class action lawsuits filed
in the Delaware state courts. While securities fraud class actions
have been closely scrutinized over the past decade, prior received
wisdom was that state courts were primarily concerned with the
frequently studied derivative suit.8 6  While the proper balance
between litigation agency costs and management agency costs has
been studied for these familiar representative lawsuits, almost
nothing has been said about the acquisition-based class actions in our
sample. In this section, we seek to apply the received learning of
representative suits to our sample to see what differences, if any, exist
for these cases. We begin with a discussion of the indicia of litigation
186. See supra Part I.B.2 for further discussion of prior empirical work.
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agency costs that reappear in our sample and then discuss parts of the
traditional story that do not fit with this data set.
A. Litigation Agency Costs: The Same Old Story?
1. Litigation Agency Costs Indicators
When we look closely at the acquisition-oriented class action
cases in our sample, we find that they exhibit several frequently
criticized characteristics of securities fraud litigation prior to the
passage of PSLRA in 1995. While there is far from universal
agreement about the measures of litigation agency costs in class
actions, these characteristics are perhaps the most commonly
discussed perceived "abusive" features of representative litigation. 8 7
Without purporting to resolve this debate here, we report our findings
below.
Beginning with Table 9, we see that Delaware class action
suits challenging acquisitions are filed quickly. Almost 70 percent of
the complaints are filed within three days of the announcement of the
acquisition transactions. Similar speed in the filing of securities fraud
cases, for example, raised concern during debate over securities fraud
class actions prior to the passage of the PSLRA in 1995.188
Filing times for derivative actions are also displayed in Table 9.
As compared with class actions, we see that derivative suits are not
filed nearly as quickly. Only 11 percent of the complaints in
derivative suits are filed within three days of the date of the
transaction challenged, whereas about two-thirds of class actions are
filed within that time frame. Clearly, derivative lawsuit attorneys are
not in a race to the courthouse.
187. Compare Macey & Miller, supra note 3, with Lerach, supra note 11.
188. Avery, supra note 73, at 375.
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Table 9: Filing Times for Complaints
iNumuer o
Acquisition-
Oriented Class
Action Suits
Filed
out$
Number of 9 6 6 20 37 59
Derivative
Suits Filed
For each transaction challenged in the acquisition context,
many of the complaints filed are virtually identical, except for the
names of the attorneys listed as counsel and the named plaintiff. For
example, when multiple complaints are filed about the same
acquisition, subsequent complaints often track word for word those
that were filed first. This is by no means universal, and some
transactions with multiple complaints will have two or more
complaint patterns. Some will follow the first complaint filed, while
others use a second model, even if they are all eventually filed by the
same Delaware law firm.18 9
Our sample does not, however, provide anything like the
startling example cited in the debate over the PSLRA, where a
complaint against a tobacco company mistakenly referred to the
defendant as a toy company which had been sued in an earlier case
#nd from which the current complaint apparently had been copied. 190
But we did find repeated use of identical language in complaints filed
in different cases, suggesting a liberal use of prior complaints in
formulating new ones in different matters.
Next, we examine another "indicator" of litigation agency costs,
the filing of multiple lawsuits attacking the same transaction. As
Table 10 shows, class action plaintiffs' lawyers commonly file multiple
189. Out-of-state law firms are required to use local Delaware counsel to assist them in filing
litigation there. DEL. CH. CT. R. 3. Rosenthal Monhait appears to be serving this function in a
large number of cases, as it is the attorney of record in more than 73 percent of the class action
complaints. The lead firms in these cases are then listed as "of counsel."
Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP, is the only other law firm with a significant number of suits in
which it is local counsel, with about 100 of the 1,000 cases.
190. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995. Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants
and Lawyers, 51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1011-12 (1996).
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suits challenging the same transaction, a fact consistent with the
pattern seen in other representative litigation. 191 The 1003 fiduciary
cases arise out of only 348 disputes, but the multiplier effect is much
more dramatic in the acquisition cases. An acquisition that spawns a
lawsuit will generally spawn multiple lawsuits, often in double figures
for one transaction (litigation involving Warner, American Home, and
Pfizer, for example, produced 41 suits). By contrast, whenoderivative
suits are filed, a substantial percentage generate only one suit per
transaction, and a much smaller fraction lead to large numbers of
complaints.
Table 10: Number of Suits Filed Per Transaction/Controversy 192
Class 80 242 353 169
Actions
Derivative 65 52 20 0
Suits
Multiple lawsuit filings also occur in federal securities fraud
actions. Comparable data for 1992 shows that there were 223
securities fraud suits filed against 113 companies during that time
period. 193 If we look at the breakdown of how many federal securities
fraud suits were filed against each company, we find that one
company was named in 21 complaints, a second company in 19
complaints, two companies in 12 complaints, and so on, concluding
with 75 companies being named in only one suit. 194 This pattern is
quite similar to the pattern shown in Table 10.
If we dig a bit deeper into our data, we find that there is a
pattern to the filing of multiple lawsuits in the class action acquisition
setting. The number of lawsuits filed attacking a single transaction is
correlated with two features of each deal: first, the size of the company
and second, whether a bidder has filed a suit along with a
191. See Romano, supra note 1, at 59 n.4.
192. This chart is for all complaints. If a lead case cohort included both derivative and class
action suits, the number of class and derivative was included in each respective group.
193. Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Law: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 777 (1993)
(statement of James Newman, Publisher & Editor, Securities Class Action Alert). Exhibit B to
this statement contains a breakdown of how many suits were filed against each company. Id. at
780 exh.B.
194. Id.
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representative shareholder. These data are presented in Table 11.
There are only 10 cases in the data set where the bidder has filed suit
(these occur in the hostile bid and second bidder categories). Seven of
these 10, however, are in suits against the 33 companies against
which six or more suits have been filed, and all ten are against larger
companies. 19 5
Table 11: Size of Companies Subject to Multiple Suits
>10 2.2 Billion
6-10 1.06 Billion 27 6 5
3-5 400 Million 31 29 1
Another potential "indicator" of litigation agency costs concerns
the identity of the law firms filing these cases. We find that class
action acquisition suits are brought by an identified plaintiffs bar, as
shown in Table 12. Sixteen firms brought at least 20 suits during the
period.196 These 16 firms, located mostly in New York City (although
many also have other offices), collectively are involved in more than 65
percent of the suits in the entire database, and about 75 percent of the
class action cases.1 97
Many of these firms are the same ones that frequently appear
in securities fraud class actions. For example, Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach, LLP ("Milberg Weiss"), the dominant firm in
securities fraud cases,1 98 appears in the top ten list of firms in our data
195. In two of the cases, the bidder's suit was the only complaint.
196. These firms were listed as "of counsel" on the complaints filed in Delaware, which is the
term used to designate an out of state firm that uses local counsel to file its suit in Delaware.
See supra note 189.
197. The earliest study of shareholder litigation, conducted using data from the 1930s, found
that a small number of law firms and lawyers filed most shareholder litigation. WOOD, supra
note 1, at 57.
198. There are various ways to measure Milberg Weiss's market share in that area. For
example, if one looks at the number of settled federal securities class actions from 1996 through
2001, they have appeared in 51.5 percent of these cases. SIMMONS, supra note 135, at 10.
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set, although with a much smaller market share than it has in the
context of securities fraud.
If we compare the "portfolios" of the top plaintiffs' law firms
with the profile of the remaining shareholder suits, we see some
marked differences. These repeat law firms are a much more common
presence in class actions (76 percent of all class actions) than in
derivative suits (they are in 32 percent of all derivative suits) or direct
suits (only in 3 percent of direct suits). These firms are more likely
than other firms to have filed a complaint in an action where there are
multiple suits per transactions. 199 Their suits settle more quickly on
average than suits filed by other attorneys (only 10 percent still open
vs. 30 percent for others). These law firms are over-represented in
hostile transactions, second bidder transactions, and MBO
transactions (more than 85 percent of the total cases for each).200
They are also present in a higher percentage of suits where there is a
settlement giving additional consideration to the plaintiff and an
attorneys' fee award, which we discuss below.
Table 12: Law Firms Bringing Largest Number of Delaware
Complaints
Lioodklnd Labaton lHudott & 3ucharow, LLU I6(
Schiffrin & Barroway, LLP 82
Wechsler, Harwood, Halebian & Feffer, LLP 69
Abbey, Gardy & Squitieri, LLP 67
Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP 67
Stull, Stull & Brody 56
Weiss & Yourman 51
Cauley, Geller, Bowman & Coates, LLC 50
Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, LLP 46
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP 43
Wolf Popper LLP 41
Wolf, Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman & Herz, LLP 40
Bull & Lifshitz, LLP 27
199. Of the lead cases that relate to transactions that have three or more suits filed, the top
16 law firms are involved in 91.74 percent of the suits. When considering all suits that are part
of a cohort of three or more suits per transactions, the top 16 firms are associated with 72
percent of those suits.
200. The percentage of suits is 87.5 percent for hostile transactions, 90.1 percent for second
bidder transactions, and 85.7 percent for MBOs.
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Shepherd & Geller, LLC 27
Lowey, Dannenberg, Bemporad & Selinger, PC 26
Kirby, McInerney, & Squire, LLP 21
Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP 16
Law Offices of Charles J. Piven, PA 13
Susman & Watkins 12
Beatie & Osborn 11
Berger & Montague, PC 11
Law Offices of Jeffrey S. Abraham 11
Fruchter & Twersky 10
Garwin, Bronzaft, Gerstein & Fisher, LLP 10
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 10
Law Offices of James V. Bashian, PC 10
Another aspect of class action litigation that stimulated much
criticism prior to the passage of PSLRA was the use of so-called
"professional plaintiffs," that is, named plaintiffs that appeared in
many suits filed often by the same firm. As discussed supra Part II, in
a class action the potential return to a single plaintiff will often be so
small as to provide little in the way of incentive to file a complaint.
Thus, plaintiff law firms have the greater incentive to bring these
cases and to find plaintiffs to name as the class representative,
allegedly leading to the use of professional plaintiffs. This makes the
characteristics of the named plaintiffs in class actions another
potential indicator of litigation agency costs.
In our data, we find a wide dispersion of plaintiffs. They are
almost always individuals. Unlike plaintiffs in securities fraud cases
since the passage of PSLRA and its lead plaintiff provision that
favored the use of institutional investors, only a handful of
institutional investors file fiduciary litigation in Delaware courts.
Table 13 lists those plaintiffs named in five or more complaints.
These 14 plaintiffs filed 111 class action lawsuits in 1999 and 2000 in
Delaware alone. If we applied the current standards set forth in
PSLRA to this group of plaintiffs, that is, that no single plaintiff can
appear in more than five securities fraud class actions during any
three year period, 201 then nine of these plaintiffs would have exceeded
this limit in two years.
If we expand our examination to consider all plaintiffs that
would have been likely to reach the five-complaint threshold in five
years, we find that there are 34 plaintiffs listed as plaintiffs in three
201. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2000). The statute does provide for an exception with
leave of the court.
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or more suits during the two-year period, collectively filing a total of
176 class actions.
As for derivative suit plaintiffs, the only ones with more than
two filings are two partnerships that we also see at the top of the list
in the class action area: Harbor Finance with five suits and Crandon
Capital with four cases. We note that the derivative cases these
entities filed were never the only suit filed and were often associated
with class actions or federal securities litigation against the same
company.
Table 13: Most Frequently Named Plaintiffs in Delaware Complaints
uranaon uapitai -rartners 11
Harbor Finance Partners 17
Steiner, William 11
Brickell Partners 10
Steiner, Kenneth 7
Kahan, Isaac 6
Green, Paul 6
Great Neck Capital Appreciation
Investment Partnership 6
Rand, Harriet 6
Hack, Ernest 5
Ellis Investments 5
Miller, Charles 5
Brody, Adele 5
Susser, Leslie 5
Turning back to examine more closely those named plaintiffs
that would have definitely exceeded the PSLRA professional plaintiff
threshold, we note that three of the top four plaintiffs listed in Table
13 are claimed to be partnerships: Crandon Capital Partners, Harbor
Finance Partners, and Brickell Partners. While we cannot be sure
based on the data that we have, these entities appear to be related.
We say this for two reasons. First, the press has reported that
Crandon Capital Partners is the managing general partner of Harbor
Finance Partners. 20 2 Second, in 34 of the 44 cases filed by these three
202. Cameron McWhirter, Two More Shareholders File Suits Against Chiquita, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, May 28, 1998, http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/lobby/6305/chiquita/ 052898-1-
33.html.
188 [Vol. 57:1
2004] THE NEW LOOK OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 189
plaintiffs, the same law firm is listed as one of the firms representing
the plaintiff.20 3 We see this same pattern for most recurring plaintiffs
with each plaintiff having a continuing relationship with a particular
law firm.20 4 While this data is hardly conclusive, it does suggest that
the three entities may well be related.
To summarize the discussion to this point, there are several
attributes of the class action acquisition-oriented cases filed in
Delaware that mirror features of securities fraud class actions prior to
the passage of PSLRA. These features have been identified by some
commentators as indicative of high levels of litigation agency costs.
They were certainly a focus of Congress' efforts to change the rules for
filing federal securities fraud claims.
2. Are There Indicators That Litigation Agency Costs May Be Lower
in Delaware Class Actions Than in Federal Securities Fraud Cases?
The class actions challenging acquisitions that are found in our
data set differ in important ways from federal securities fraud class
actions. Some of these differences could indicate lower litigation
agency costs for the Delaware cases. We begin with the settlement
and dismissal patterns for these suits.
Table 14: Settlement and Dismissal Rates for Acquisition-Oriented
Class Action Lead Cases
Number of Suits 10 22 30 5
Settled
Number of Suits 31 34 64 2
Dismissed
Most of these cases settle or are dismissed quickly. As of
August 2002, almost 88 percent of the class actions (196 of 224) had
been settled or dismissed. In 41 cases, a settlement or dismissal
occurred within six months of filing. Looking further out, we find
another 56 cases were resolved within a year and 94 more within two
years of filing.
203. The firm is Wechsler Harwood.
204. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 85, at 2061 ("The most common recruitment practice
followed by plaintiffs' attorneys apparently is to maintain a list of potential plaintiffs and their
stockholdings.").
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By comparison, derivative cases stay open longer than class
actions. In our database, about three times as high a percentage of
the derivative suits were still open (45 of 135 or 35 percent) as
compared to class actions (25 out of 213 or 12 percent).205
Furthermore, for the cases that have settled, the median time to
settlement was 20 percent longer for derivative suits (478 days) than
for class actions (397 days).
In contrast, federal securities cases remain open much longer,
and, among those that are resolved, there are more settlements than
dismissals, the opposite of what we see in the state cases. Prior to the
passage of PSLRA, an average of 2.67 percent of the federal securities
fraud cases filed settled within one year.20 6 If we expand this time
frame outward to two years, we find 18.54 percent of these federal
cases settling, with this number continuing to increase so that within
four years 57.59 percent of these federal class actions settled. 20 7
Overall, a very high percentage of these cases eventually settled. If,
for example, we look at all federal securities fraud class actions filed
between April 1988 and September 1996, 87.6 percent resulted in a
settlement, "with the large majority of the remainder being resolved
by dispositive motions or voluntary dismissals."208
PSLRA further slowed the settlement process in federal
securities fraud class actions. If we look at federal securities fraud
class actions after PSLRA, we find that over the period 1996-1999,
less than 1 percent of these cases settled within one year, and only
11.58 percent of these actions settled in less than two years.20 9 If we
look at settlement rates further out, only 26.06 percent of these cases
were settled four years after filing.210 While it is too soon to determine
the ultimate fate of many post-PSLRA cases, we can report that in
1998, for example, 85 percent of all dispositions of federal securities
fraud class actions were settlements. 211
205. The data is as of August 2002. This difference is more noticeable for closely held
corporations and for the largest public corporations (the NYSE listed companies). For NASDAQ
companies, or companies traded on smaller markets, the percentage of open cases was roughly
similar to class actions. The number of open cases for close corporations likely reflects the more
contentious differences among a small set of shareholders. The NYSE cases are those that most
overlap with federal securities actions and include some of the most high profile business
controversies in the pre-Enron era of litigation. For example, this group of open cases included
suits against Raytheon, Rite Aid, Providian, and Mattel.
206. BAJAJ ETAL., supra note 118, at 17.
207. Id.
208. GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 103, § IX (footnote omitted).
209. BAJAJ ETAL., supra note 118, at 17.
210. Id.
211. FOSTER ET AL., supra note 104, at 6 & fig.10.
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We see that federal securities fraud class actions are dismissed
much more slowly than our cases. Pre-PSLRA dismissal rates start at
around 2 percent within one year, 8.23 percent after two years, and
10.89 percent within four years. 212 Post-PSLRA these rates have
dropped substantially: 0.22 percent within one year, 4.01 percent
within two years, and 5.79 percent within four years.213
What are the reasons for the large differences in the settlement
and dismissal rates for Delaware fiduciary duty class actions and
federal securities fraud class actions? One possible explanation of
these variations is that the Delaware cases are tied to the completion
of mergers and acquisitions, and therefore are likely to be resolved at
or around the time that these transactions close. The value of the
underlying claims is well known to the plaintiffs and defendants in
these cases, so it is unnecessary to spend lots of time litigating the
cases. Early settlement or dismissal is therefore socially desirable:
defendants can get on with their business, shareholders get any relief
to which they are entitled, and the cases are resolved quickly with a
minimum of costs and judicial resources expended. In short, the class
action provides a mechanism for quickly resolving all of the claims
arising out of the transaction.
A second possible explanation is that federal securities fraud
claims raise much greater potential liability for the defendants, both
because the legal claims are stronger and easier to prove and because
the potential damages are much more substantial. Firms are
unwilling to settle such cases for large amounts early on in the case,
and the plaintiffs will not accept small percentage awards on their
claims. By contrast, the value of the claims under Delaware law may
be relatively small because the legal claims are hard to prove and/or
the potential damages are low. This makes little litigation activity
and early settlement (or dismissal) of the Delaware class actions a
rational decision for plaintiffs, especially if defendants want to tie up
the loose ends of a completed acquisition. In other words, plaintiffs
invest little in the cases because there is little to be gained, and those
gains do not increase with additional time and effort.214
212. BAJAJ ET AL., supra note 118, at 19.
213. Id.
214. There may also be institutional reasons for the differences. For example, the Delaware
courts have great expertise in handling class actions, and may move cases along more quickly
than their federal cousins. Another possible factor could be that the larger damage claims in
federal actions could mean that there are more insurance carriers (given the practice of layers of
insurance coverage) that must be represented in settlement negotiations. This could make
settlement negotiations more complex in the federal cases.
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Both theories are plausible. The data do not precisely fit either
one. In considering the first theory, we find that while some cases
settle around the time of the closing of the transaction, many cases
settle months later with little activity visible at any point in the case.
This suggests the efficient resolution of claims story is not a complete
explanation for the settlement and dismissal pattern. On the other
hand, as we saw supra Part II.F, the median settlement award is
higher in Delaware cases than in the federal securities lawsuits.
While there are fewer settlements in the state court cases than in the
federal cases, this disparity would still seem to indicate that state law
claims have some teeth in them, and cannot simply be dismissed as
strike suit settlements.
If we look at attorneys' fees awards, we see some evidence
supporting the claim that Delaware class action litigation has lower
litigation agency costs. The attorneys' fees that the Delaware courts
award are relatively modest as a percentage of recovery received by
the plaintiff shareholders, far lower than those awarded in federal
securities class actions. In the 20 control shareholder transactions
settled in the Delaware courts, the median amount of additional
consideration paid to shareholders was about $15 million.215 The
median percentage of attorneys' fees for these cases was 5 percent of
the additional consideration (with a range extending up to 37 percent).
In dollar terms, the median attorneys' fees awarded by the court were
$875,000 (with a range extending up to $4.4 million).21 6
Attorneys' fees in derivative suits are generally less in absolute
amount. Of the 15 derivative suits for which we found some form of
relief for the plaintiff, eight were treated as class actions for purposes
of settlement, were part of a series of suits from the same transaction
in which most of the suits were class actions, were part of a complaint
that included class action counts as well as derivative counts in the
complaint, or had a settlement that was paid directly into a securities
fraud fund. Of the seven remaining derivative suits, only two had
attorneys' fees over $1 million, one had fees of $625,000, and the
others had fees that ranged between $80,000-$250,000.
By contrast, the median attorneys' fees awards in federal
securities fraud cases from 1991 to 1996 were about 32 percent of the
215. Since in these cases the controlling shareholder already owned between 54 percent and
91 percent of the company, the per share amount of additional consideration was paid only on a
fraction of the outstanding shares. We are calculating these amounts based on the difference
between the initial price offered in the transaction and the final consideration paid to
shareholders in the transaction at or before the time of the settlement.
216. Nine of the 17 cases in which attorneys' fees exceeded $1 million were control
shareholder acquisitions.
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settlement value. 217 This figure varies little across industries and
location of the litigation. 218 Obviously, this is a far greater percentage
of the settlement than the median percentage for the cases in our
Delaware data. Furthermore, the awards in the cases in our database
are a much smaller percentage of recoveries than earlier studies of
shareholder litigation have found.219  The low percentage of the
settlement going to the plaintiffs' counsel supports the claim that
Delaware class actions efficiently resolve the claims surrounding
mergers and acquisitions with low litigation agency costs, but it could
also support an argument that the litigation contributed relatively
little to the consideration that otherwise would have been achieved in
negotiations between the controlling shareholder and a special
litigation committee of the board.
Any claim that Delaware class actions have low litigation
agency costs, however, would be undercut if it turned out that the
hourly returns to the attorneys in these Delaware cases were very
high. If hourly fees were quite high, then it could be argued that the
plaintiffs' attorneys did little work on these cases, which settled
quickly, and they received a high return for their time.
We can calculate the actual hourly rates paid in the Delaware
class actions. Plaintiffs' law firms must file briefs to accompany their
fee petitions to the Delaware Chancery Court. These documents show
that plaintiffs' law firms report spending 550 hours on the median
case (with a range between 200 hours and 1400 hours). Using this
information and the size of the attorneys' fees award, we can calculate
the hourly fee for each case settled. 220 If we do this, we find that these
hourly fees range from $420 to $3600 with a median of $1260.221 Of
course, these are the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees for those cases that
settled and do not factor in the absence of attorneys' fees for those
cases that are dismissed without settlement (and for which we have no
information on time spent for which no fees are recovered). 222
217. MARTIN ETAL., supra note 118, at 12-13.
218. Id. at 14-15.
219. Jones's study of shareholder litigation found an average attorney fee award of 16.2
percent of the total plaintiff recovery. Jones, supra note 95, at 567.
220. We note that we cannot determine the percentage of these hours that were put into the
case prior to the negotiation of the settlement and the number of hours that plaintiffs' counsel
spent after an agreement had been reached. For example, it was impossible to determine the
percentage of hours spent on confirmatory discovery to show the court that the settlement was
reasonable.
221. This reflects information in 20 of the 31 cases for which there was sufficient information
to calculate hourly attorneys' fees awarded in acquisition cases.
222. The contingent nature of these cases is one factor courts use in deciding on fee requests.
Attorneys' fees are supported using a multi-factor test that includes discussion of the contingent
nature of the case, the difficulty of the case, the quality of opposing counsel and other factors.
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To accurately calculate average attorneys' fees for all of the
class actions, we would need to greatly reduce these estimates to
reflect time invested in cases that do not result in settlements (about
61 percent of cases are resolved without an award of attorneys' fees).
Furthermore, we cannot determine the median hourly attorneys' fee
award to plaintiffs' attorneys in federal securities fraud cases, so as to
generate a comparative benchmark. Thus, once again, we cannot
conclusively determine if the size of attorneys' fees awards is evidence
of lower litigation agency costs.
There is one final aspect of the attorneys' fees data that bears
comment. If we focus on how attorneys' fees awards vary across
settlements, we find that duty of loyalty allegations result in the
largest fee awards in acquisition cases (such allegations have the
highest settlements, too). The highest awards in non-acquisition cases
were in two cases that both involved management self-dealing around
the time of an acquisition. 223 In third-party transactions, attorneys'
fees awards were higher when there was an allegation of improper
allocation of merger consideration among different classes of stock or
of self-dealing behavior in buying and selling assets in connection with
an acquisition. For MBOs, there is always a conflict of interest, and
fee awards fall into a relatively narrow range between $225,000 and
$750,000.
In settlements where shareholders receive relief other than
additional consideration, attorneys' fees are modest, with a median
around $300,000 and only two cases awarding above $1 million.
Attorneys' fees awards where there is no other relief to the
shareholders almost always occur in acquisition transactions where
the filing of the case preceded an increase in the merger consideration,
but where the plaintiffs' attorneys have not been able to clearly
establish any causal link between the two events. 224
We interpret this pattern of attorneys' fees awards as reflective
of the strength of the underlying substantive legal claims. Delaware
case law is most demanding of directors in conflict-of-interest
scenarios. This leads us to consider the evidence on any management
agency costs reductions that result from these acquisition class
actions.
223. In a case arising around Plains All-American, a recovery of $10.6 million paid to the
partnership brought attorneys' fees of $1.056 million. In litigation against Waste Management,
Inc. cancellation of executive compensation said to be worth $23 million brought attorneys' fees
of $1.6 million.
224. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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B. Affirmative Relief in Acquisition Class Actions: Managerial Agency
Cost Reductions?
Having reviewed the evidence concerning litigation agency
costs, we turn now to the impact of acquisition-oriented litigation on
managerial agency costs. When we look at the impact of these class
actions on managerial agency costs, we are forced to use proxies for
how these costs are impacted by litigation. We cannot measure, for
example, the deterrent effect of class actions on potential managerial
misconduct, although most commentators would readily agree that
such an effect exists. 225 What we can measure with our data are the
types of claims made in the cases and the value conferred to
shareholders from settlements of these cases. This value may be
monetary or come in other forms.
These class actions universally raise claims of high managerial
agency costs such as allegations of failure to maximize shareholder
value in a sale of control under Revlon or Unocal, or challenges under
Weinberger to the fairness of potential conflict-of-interest transactions
such as control shareholder acquisitions and management buyouts. In
Table 15, we show the frequency with which these claims are made
and the type of relief that is granted in the cases in which they are
made.
Table 15: Claims Made in Complaints Filed in Acquisition Cases
Revlon Claims 233 0226
Unocal Claims 10 0
Weinberger 581 228227
Looking first at Revlon and Unocal claims, what Table 15
shows is that, in a database almost entirely made up acquisition cases,
the impact of these two stalwart Delaware cases is remarkably
225. The studies of whether litigation is correlated with changes in shareholder value are
one effort at such a measurement. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 99.
226. In one case, a settlement included attorneys' fees but no other identified relief.
227. The 228 complaints in this category represent the total number of cases originally filed
connected to lead cases reported as producing substantive relief. Recall from Table 9 that most
of the lead cases have more than one complaint filed against the same company for the same
controversy.
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slight.228  Certainly Revlon is frequently included in plaintiffs
arguments, with more than 30 percent of all acquisition complaints
making reference to its requirement to maximize shareholder value.
Revlon, however, is only properly invoked in very limited factual
settings: either in cash for stock transactions (36 cases involved such
facts), or where an acquiring company in a stock for stock merger has
a controlling shareholder (20 cases had this fact pattern). If we
examine the complaints that contain factual allegations that would
satisfy Revlon, we find that no substantive relief occurred in any of
those cases.
Unocal is notable for how infrequently it appears. Only a very
small number of complaints include allegations based on Unocal and
none of these produce substantive relief. We should expect, however,
that most Unocal claims would be brought by a bidder trying to strike
down takeover defenses that are blocking an acquisition. By contrast,
in most of the class actions in our data set, the target has already
agreed to a transaction. Still, the lack of Unocal claims is consistent
with other published reports that show that Delaware courts have
rarely used Unocal in the past ten years, even in direct suits brought
by a frustrated bidder to strike down a defensive tactics. 229
Duty of loyalty claims are by far the most commonly made
allegations, arising primarily in friendly deals with conflicts of
interest, such as control shareholder transactions and MBO cases. By
comparison to Revlon and Unocal claims, these allegations appear in
settled cases much more frequently. We interpret this as an
indication that such claims have greater legal bite.
Table 16: Impact of Multiple Lawsuits on Likelihood of Settlement
Likelihood of 57/279 19/56 8/14
Relief (%) 20% 39% 57%
228. We remind the reader that we are discussing class action cases here and not bidder
suits. Bidder suits have often led to important decisions by the Delaware courts concerning the
validity of antitakeover defenses, and of various forms of deal protection measures. See, e.g.,
cases cited supra note 47. These cases illustrate the important impact of the Delaware courts on
mergers and acquisitions practices, such as how takeover defenses are used and merger
agreements are drafted.
229. See, e.g., Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000). Such exceptions
have usually come from the Chancery Court and only rarely from the Delaware Supreme Court.
See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A2d. 914, 934-39 (Del. 2003) (holding that deal
protection measures preclude target company's directors from exercising their fiduciary duties to
shareholders); see also Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the
Shareholder Role: Sacred Space in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 285 (2001).
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The data in Table 16 show that there is a positive correlation
between monetary recovery and the number of suits generated in an
acquisition. As the number of law suits per controversy increases,
there is an increase in the likelihood of additional consideration being
obtained. For 0-4 lawsuits per controversy, 57 of 279 (20 percent)
lawsuits produce some relief; for 5-9 lawsuits 19 of 56 (39 percent)
produce some relief; for 10 and above, 8 of 14 (57 percent) produce
some affirmative relief. In other words, we find that there is a
connection between the likelihood of a settlement (managerial agency
cost reduction) and the number of complaints filed in the case
(litigation agency cost increase).
We cannot be sure of the causal connection here. We think it
likely that plaintiffs' attorneys can preliminarily assess the merits of
these class actions before deciding to invest the (minimal) amount of
resources necessary to file a complaint. If this is correct, then we
would expect that more complaints would be filed in cases with high
settlement potential. This would seem to indicate that the filing of
multiple complaints is a sign that a particular case is strong (high
managerial agency costs are present).
It is possible that the causal connection runs in the opposite
direction though. In this scenario, plaintiffs' attorneys file multiple
complaints not because of the merits of the case, but for other reasons,
such as the ease of finding a shareholder to act as the named plaintiff,
the degree of publicity surrounding the case, or the size of the
defendant, all of which (the theory goes) are uncorrelated with the
merits of the action. The filing of many complaints leads companies to
settle the case, again not because of the merits, but for other reasons
such as the adverse publicity, the concern for the high costs of fighting
so many suits, etc. In this scenario, we are concerned that frivolous
claims are getting settled for too much.
We also find a positive correlation between a settlement with
monetary relief and the filing of a complaint by one of the top 16
plaintiffs' law firms shown in Table 12. One possible implication of
this connection is that the plaintiffs' bar may be the most effective
group in representing shareholder interests. This could undercut any
claim that the presence of a well-established plaintiffs' bar is solely an
indicator of high litigation agency costs-it may also indicate higher
management agency cost reductions. 230
230. Of course, there are other possible interpretations of the causal connection here. For
example, these law firms could be most likely to file complaints when the consideration offered in
the deal will be inevitably increased. We have heard anecdotal stories of plaintiffs' lawyers (or
their paralegals) sitting in front of computers watching for the announcement of transactions on
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The friendly transactions that were the subject of litigation
were mostly successfully closed in all categories, but with some
variation. About 85 percent of the third-party acquisitions, and 88
percent of the control shareholder transactions, closed. The MBOs
had a less compelling closure rate of about 75 percent. 231
A slightly different picture emerges for the hostile and second
bidder transactions. In the hostile bidder transactions, there can be a
bidder vying with incumbent management for control of the target
company, and in the second bidder cases there are at least two bidders
in the hunt. From the plaintiff shareholders' perspective, this means
that the transaction will be completed if either bidder succeeds. In
other words, to get a complete picture of the transaction's success we
need to add together the number of times that either the first or other
bidder(s) gain control of the target company.
In our sample, we find that there were 23 hostile bidder lead
cases. Out of these 23 cases, the hostile bidder succeeded in their bid
8 times and the target company was sold to another bidder 6 times. In
8 of the remaining cases, the target defeated all control bids, and in
one case, we could not determine the outcome. So in 14 out of 22
hostile bids for which an outcome is known, or about 64 percent of the
time, a deal was completed. We note that this evidence runs counter
to popular perceptions that hostile bids are no longer successful, and
suggests that the "Just Say No" defense is not foolproof.
In the second bidder transactions, completion rates are even
higher. In the 11 suits classified as second bidder lead cases, the
second bidder won in five. A different bidder succeeded in another two
lead cases, the first bidder acquired the target in three cases, and in
one case no deal was struck. Thus, in more than 90 percent of the
cases, some kind of deal was struck and shareholders received an
alternative transaction to that originally proposed by management in
7 out of 11 cases, or about 63 percent of the time.
Of those acquisitions that were completed (about three-fourths
of the acquisition sample), plaintiffs got some kind of relief in about
one-third of the cases. Not surprisingly, when the underlying
transaction terminates for business reasons, the shareholder litigation
Bloomberg's new services and filing a complaint whenever the premium offered in the deal is less
than a certain range.
231. Comparable data for the closure rate as to similar transactions in which there was not
litigation would be useful; such data, however, is unavailable at this point.
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is almost always dismissed with no relief (31 of 33 cases), with only
one case of any substantive relief. 232
Table 17 documents the types of settlements that occur in
acquisition cases. We find four different types of settlement in these
cases: additional monetary consideration paid to the target company
shareholders (above what was originally promised in the
announcement of the transaction); other substantive relief, such as
changes in the corporate governance structure of the corporation;
additional disclosures about the transaction (and no other relief); and
no relief to the shareholders, but an award of attorneys' fees to the
class counsel. 233
Table 17: Form of Relief in Acquisition Cases by Type of Transaction
uontrol ii 1 1 zo
Shareholder
Acquisition
MBO Type 5 4 1 0 10 42
Transaction
Third-Party 6 5 4 5 20 72
Transaction
Second Bidder 0 2 0 0 2 11
Deals
Hostile 0 2 0 1 3 23
Transactions
Total 31 16 6 7 60 213
Table 17 shows that settlements are not evenly distributed
across the different forms of deals. Control shareholder acquisition
settlements are statistically significantly more likely to result in
additional monetary consideration than other types of settlements
(with P-values all less than .05). There are also other differences in
the settlement frequency and the form of the settlement across the
232. Thirty-one cases were dismissed with no relief; in one there was additional
consideration and in another there was other substantive relief. Two cases remain open and in
three, the status could not be determined.
233. The cases in this last category are largely instances where the case became moot after
the bidder took actions, such as raising the bid price to a higher level. See supra note 184 and
accompanying text.
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types of transactions. In order to explore this data more fully, we look
at each type of transaction below.
1. Control Shareholder Transactions
The most striking feature of Table 17 is that the pattern of
affirmative relief is strongest in those cases in which there is a
controlling shareholder who has proposed an acquisition that will
effectively cash-out the minority shareholders. This type of
transaction is accompanied by a high likelihood of substantial
management agency costs.
Looking at the data, we find that in 20 of 65 of the controlling
shareholder cases, additional consideration was paid to the minority
shareholders, and in another five cases there were attorneys' fees paid
in a settlement. Among the larger group of all acquisitions in which
additional consideration was reported, two-thirds of them (20/30) are
controlling shareholder cash-out transactions. These cases, which
make up 30 percent of all acquisition complaints, constitute up to two-
thirds of the settlements in which additional monies are paid. 234
Some commentators have argued that these settlements simply
result in bidders paying target company shareholders what they
would have received anyway without the litigation. 235 The logic
behind this argument runs as follows: a knowledgeable acquirer will
not make its best offer when it announces its offer, but rather will
expect that shareholder litigation will be filed after it announces the
deal, and therefore will offer a very low price in expectation that it will
later raise the price as part of a settlement of the anticipated
litigation. The bidder thus pays no more in the deal than it would
have anyway, and gets the additional benefit of obtaining a release of
all potential claims that arise out of the transaction.
If this argument were correct, then we would expect several
things to flow from it. First, if all bidders were rationally engaging in
this game, we would expect to see all deals uniformly priced low and
all class actions settling so that shareholders get roughly the same
(slightly higher) premium for their shares. As Table 17 shows, less
234. Nine of these cases are still open and could provide additional consideration, so that
when all cases are completed, the recovery rate in controlling shareholder cases will probably be
in the 50 percent range of the 65 cases.
235. Professor Steve Choi, however, agues that settlements result because controlling
shareholders are more vulnerable to frivolous litigation, as illustrated by cases like Sinclair Oil
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). E-mail from Steve Choi to Robert B. Thompson and Randall
Thomas (Jan. 23, 2003) (on file with author). Thus, payments in these settlements may reflect
vulnerability, and not otherwise bad conduct. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785 (2003).
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than one-third of all cases produce any affirmative relief, and, even for
controlling shareholder cases, relief occurs in less than half of the
cases, which we interpret as a sign that not all bidders are following
this practice. If some bidders are settling cases, while others are not,
then we must dig deeper to understand why this is the case.
We decided to examine how the total consideration (offer price
plus settlement value) paid to shareholders in these settled cases
compared with the consideration paid in the remainder of the control
shareholder transactions that were resolved without relief. As Table
18 shows, if we divide our sample of control shareholder cases into
those cases where a monetary settlement is obtained and those where
there was no such payment, a very interesting pattern emerges.
Table 18: Control Shareholder Transaction Premiums
With 20 15 11.9 30.04
Monetary
Settlement
Without 28 25.5 0 25.5
Monetary
Settlement
We first observe that the median of the premium offered to
target company shareholders in cases in which there is a settlement
averages almost 10 percent less than the median paid in transactions
in which there is no monetary settlement. As the data shows, the
median of the original offer price is slightly more than 25 percent
higher than the previous trading price for the stock in cases where
there is no monetary settlement, but only 15 percent higher in the
cases involving a monetary settlement. 237 These initial differences are
statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance.
236. The sum of median offer price and median additional consideration does not equal the
median total consideration because median additional consideration is calculated as a percentage
of the premium over the initial market price, not as an increase over the offer price.
237. Of course, this premium may not reflect the long-term value of the corporation, and
plaintiffs argue in all of these cases that the acquisition was timed to take advantage of a
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Monetary settlements more than make up this difference. For
the cases that settle with an award of additional monetary relief, the
median amount paid in the settlement is about 12 percent of the price
offered in the takeover. This relief is in addition to what the
shareholders received for their shares in the transaction, the original
offer price. If we add the original offer price and the value of the
settlement together, we see that the total median consideration paid
to shareholders in the settling cases is more than 30 percent over the
market price at the time of the announcement of the transaction.
When we compare this figure with the value that shareholders receive
in cases where there is no settlement, we find that shareholders do
better when bidders start low and are forced to raise the value paid by
litigation. However, the differences in the final prices are not
statistically significant.
These results show that the impact of the monetary class
action settlements is to raise the premium paid in the lowest-priced
control shareholder transactions above the average level for all of
these transactions in our sample. In other words, acquisition-oriented
class action litigation polices the worst control shareholder deals, and
benefits target company shareholders by insuring that they get
compensated as well as, or better than, shareholders in deals that are
more fully priced.
Returning to the earlier discussion about why bidders settle
cases, and whether such settlements are pre-priced into a lower deal
price, this evidence suggests that controlling shareholders wind up
paying target company shareholders more in the settled cases. Many
bidders price their offer at a reasonable premium over the market
price (25 percent on average), and when litigation is filed, refuse to
settle the case. Other bidders try to cash out minority shareholders at
a low price, and when confronted with litigation over the terms of the
deal, raise the price to a higher premium. In other words, the initial
low bidders pay more to target shareholders in the form of additional
consideration in the settlement, plus they must pay the plaintiff class'
attorneys' fees. These fees average $1.379 million in the settled cases.
A rational bidder must therefore decide whether the benefits of
starting low and later settling the case, such as obtaining a release of
all claims arising out of the transaction, are worth these additional
costs. 238 In addition, the bidder must factor in the potential savings in
depressed price of the stock and that the managers executing the transaction have an
information advantage over the public.
238. We note that such a release can eliminate not only state law claims arising out of the
transaction, but also federal securities law claims that could be raised on the same fact pattern.
However, unless the federal claim arose out of an acquisition, or one of the other listed
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making a low offer in cases in which the bidder does not get sued by
shareholders. While we presently lack data on the percentage of
announced deals in which litigation is not filed, and the
characteristics of those deals, we speculate that the larger, public
companies are less likely to be able to announce a low ball offer
without attracting lawsuits. If we are correct, then there may be
different bidding and settlement patterns for larger and smaller deals.
Another set of questions concerns the impact on shareholder
wealth when a target company's board of directors appoints a special
committee to negotiate on behalf of its shareholders in a control
shareholder transaction. 239 The special committee's negotiations on
behalf of the shareholders often are accompanied by increases in the
consideration paid in these transactions. These increases may reflect
hard-nosed bargaining by these independent directors, or they could
just be paid as part of a cynical ploy by the majority shareholder to
insure that the courts approve the terms of the deal. We cannot be
sure which is the case by examining only the value paid to
shareholders.
This problem is of more than passing concern to our work. In
most of the settlements that we discuss in this section, we find that
there is both a special committee working on behalf of the target
shareholders, and a group of class action lawyers seeking an increase
in the price paid in the deal. If the majority shareholder raises the
offer price after negotiations with the special committee and the
plaintiffs' lawyers, then how do we determine how to allocate
responsibility for the increase between the two groups?
In this paper, we report the full increase in consideration as a
benefit of the litigation, although we recognize that in some cases this
overstates the value of the litigation. As a rough approximation it may
be largely accurate, though, even if the special committee's efforts are
part of the reason for the increase. Without the presence, or at least
the threat, of shareholder litigation, there would be little incentive for
the special committee to put forth maximum effort for the minority
shareholders. Furthermore, the special committee would have less
negotiating power with the majority shareholder to push for increases
exceptions that Delaware carves out, a state law class action would be pre-empted by the
Uniform Standards Act of 1998. For a discussion of the Delaware carve out, see supra note 40.
239. A special committee may be commonly employed in this context to insure that the board
satisfies its duties under Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). If the special
committee is truly independent and acts as an aggressive negotiator on behalf of the target's
minority shareholders, then the Delaware courts have considered that an important factor in
determining whether the board has met its fiduciary obligations.
203
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
in the price paid if the majority shareholder did not need to worry
about shareholders' attorneys monitoring the process.
2. Management Buyout Transactions
There are five monetary settlements in the MBO class actions
filed in our sample. Table 19 presents information on the value of
these settlements and the comparison between settled and nonsettled
cases.
Table 19: Management Buyout Transaction Premiums
Monetary
Settlement
27.25 7.00 29.40
Without 36 27.95 0 27.95
Monetary
Settlement
What can we say about how these settlements impact the total
consideration paid to shareholders? First, we begin with the caution
that we have far fewer monetary settlements of management buyout
transactions. Working with such a small sample makes
generalizations hazardous, and thus we must be more careful in what
we say about these cases.
The first thing that jumps out of Table 19 is that the average
initial premiums in the two sets of cases are almost identical. If we
consider monetary settlements, though, we find that the target
company shareholders in those cases receive a small increase in the
amount of cash they get for their shares. The total amount that
shareholders receive in the two groups, however, looks quite similar,
with less than a two percent difference in settled cases. This suggests
that we have the same pattern that we saw with the control
shareholder cases: settlements boost target shareholders' gain in
settled cases to at least the same level as those achieved in other
cases. Although these results are not as striking as those in Table 18
and are not statistically significant, they can support a claim that
class action litigation is policing these MBO transactions.
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3. Third-Party Friendly Transactions
As we saw in Table 17, there are six settlements where
additional consideration was paid to the target company shareholders
in a suit challenging a friendly third-party merger transaction.
Because there is no direct conflict of interest in a friendly third-party
merger, the presence of these settlements suggests class action
litigation is performing a role beyond policing direct conflicts of
interest. If we look closer at these settlements, however, most of them
arise out of a claim that managers have shifted too much
consideration to themselves in negotiating the terms of the deal. In
two of the six monetary settlements, the underlying cases challenge
the terms of preferred stock or dual class stock where the terms of the
merger were said to significantly favor the insiders' stock over the
public, and in two others the plaintiffs challenge self-dealing
transactions prior to the mergers. In short, most of these settled cases
are conflict-of-interest claims even though the underlying transaction
appears on the surface to be an arm's-length sale.
Table 20: Third-Party Merger Transaction Premiums
With 2 23.24%
Monetary
Settlement
Without 45 23.00%
Monetary
Settlement
4. Hostile Bidder and Second Bidder Transactions
In contrast to the disposition of the conflict-of-interest cases
discussed above, hostile and second bidder acquisitions produce no
monetary settlements and little other relief. Beginning with the
hostile deals, all 23 of the transaction-oriented lead cases have been
concluded. 240 Twenty-two of the 23 cases were class actions. Out of
the class actions, 20 of the 22 class actions were dismissed with no
240. Twenty of them involved at least one of our top 16 plaintiffs' law firms.
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relief. In the two class action cases that settled, one produced no relief
with only an award of attorneys' fees, while the other resulted in some
additional disclosure plus attorneys' fees.
The suits arising when a second bidder appeared on the scene
after the announcement of a third-party merger fare little better.
Transactions arising in this context generate the most suits per
transactions (including 41 in one transaction, but still a higher
average of suits per transaction without that case included). Three of
the 11 cases are still pending, but in the eight that have been
concluded, there were only two settlements and both resulted in no
relief but a payment of attorneys' fees.
Table 21: Hostile Bidder Transaction Premiums
When we turn to the data on the premiums paid in these
transactions, we see from Table 21 that the premiums proposed for
hostile deals are substantially higher than those in the friendly deals.
We believe that the absence of a conflict of interest and the high
premiums paid are the most important reasons why there are no
substantive settlements in these cases. When acquirers pay a full
price in an arm's-length acquisition, there is much less ground for
legal claims that shareholders did not receive a fair price for their
stock. Furthermore, proposed hostile transactions fail to lead to a
completed transaction more often than friendly deals, and this would
be an additional reason why hostile actions do not settle.
There is another distinguishing characteristic of these cases-
the class action lawsuits filed are frequently companion cases to direct
suits filed by the bidder itself. Bidder suits usually challenge the
target company's implementation or use of defensive tactics as a
method of depriving its shareholders of the right to sell their shares to
the bidder via tendering into a tender offer, or to vote their shares in
favor of a bidder's proposed course of action, such as removing the
target's board of directors. As we discussed above, shareholder
litigation challenging director action in these instances does not result
in any substantive relief for shareholders, and this conclusion is not
affected by the presence of bidder suits. What we have yet to discuss,
however, is whether bidder suits have a positive impact on the
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likelihood that the bidder is successful in acquiring the target
company.
Turning to this question, in the second bidder cases, we have
11 lead cases filed, and in five of them we find both a bidder suit and
shareholder class action complaints. In all five transactions where a
second bidder suit was filed, we find that the second bidder failed to
gain control of the target company (four of these companies were
bought by another bidder and in one case no transaction was
completed with any bidder). By contrast, in the remaining six second
bidder transactions where only shareholder litigation was filed, the
second bidder was successful in winning the bidding contest for the
target company in every case. Thus, it seems as if the second bidders
filed their own suit only when they sensed that their bids were in
trouble, and that litigation might shift things in their direction, but
that the bidder lawsuit was unable to accomplish this objective.
In the hostile bidder transactions, we find five bidder lawsuits
among the 23 lead cases. In these five transactions, the hostile bidder
acquired the target company in two of them, two other companies
were sold to a different bidder, and in one transaction the target
remained independent. In the remaining 18 hostile bid transactions,
in which no bidder suit was filed, we see six instances in which the
hostile bidder gained control of the target, four sales to different
bidders, and seven cases where the target remained independent. 241
We conclude that the hostile bidder suits may have had some positive
effect on that bidder's chances of gaining control of the target, but that
the evidence is not compelling.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Shareholder litigation has often been cast in the role of the evil
stepsister of modern corporate governance: worthless and expensive to
keep around. Based on the empirical evidence we have reported, we
conclude that the acquisition-oriented shareholder class actions filed
in Delaware add value, even if they also have costs. These suits have
become the most visible form of shareholder litigation in state courts
and rival federal securities fraud suits in importance. When we
analyze the managerial agency cost reduction, and litigation agency
cost increases, associated with these Delaware cases, we find some
familiar patterns, as well as some very different ones.
With respect to litigation agency costs, we find that there are
some parts of the traditional story about representative litigation that
241. In one case, we were unable to determine the outcome.
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are also visible in this new outpost. For example, these acquisition-
oriented class actions are brought very quickly after the
announcement of a possible litigation-producing event, and there are
multiple suits per transaction. Both phenomena are consistent with
lawyers seeking to secure their position as lead counsel, perhaps at
the expense of the class. In addition, as in the earlier forms of
shareholder litigation, there is an identifiable set of plaintiffs' law
firms that show up in these suits and there are also many repeat
plaintiffs.
At the same time, however, we find that there are parts of the
standard picture of high litigation agency costs that do not show up
here. The old story is one of small settlements for shareholders, large
attorneys' fees, and frequent nuisance settlements. In this data set,
we find settlements that are larger than in the other forms of
representative litigation and attorneys' fees that are a smaller
percentage of the amount recovered. Overall, these suits appear to
have lower litigation agency costs than the older forms of
representative litigation.
As far as managerial agency cost reductions go, some of the
results presented here suggest that these class action suits do result
in significant reductions. 242 First, while these lawsuits are brought in
a variety of acquisition transactions, affirmative relief does not occur
across the board. Rather, the cases in which there is additional
consideration paid to shareholders are decidedly skewed toward
control shareholder settings, the transactions in which there is the
greatest likelihood of a conflict of interest by management.
Second, if we take only those control shareholder transactions
that evidence this larger likelihood of conflict of interest, we find that
affirmative relief occurs only in those cases in which the initial
premium offered by the conflicted controlling shareholder was the
lowest in relation to the prior market price. This finding suggests that
the merits of litigation do make a difference, and that shareholder
litigation deserves a seat at the table of corporate governance.
None of these findings disturb the basic reality that the net
value of shareholder litigation will always depend on the balance
between the benefits that come from its constraining managerial
agency costs and the offsetting possibility that the representative
litigation will spawn its own litigation agency costs. Attention to this
242. We remind the reader that causation is always difficult to establish in these settings,
and that it may be that the planning strategy of a company, or the actions of another group such
as a special litigation committee of the board, contribute to, or cause, these reductions.
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balance remains a necessary focus for law reform efforts as new
opportunities arise to increase the benefits while limiting the costs. 243
243. Two policy initiatives that we are particularly interested in studying are whether state
courts should adopt lead plaintiff provisions and enact restrictions on professional plaintiffs,
similar to those provisions that were adopted in PSLRA. We think that these may present
opportunities for litigation agency cost reductions without increasing management agency costs.
209

